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MLS PROMOTION!  CAN MLS’S SINGLE ENTITY STATUS
PROTECT IT FROM “PRO/REL”?
I. INTRODUCTION: AN OFFER TO CREATE HEADLINES
In June 2017, Major League Soccer (MLS) received a massive
media rights offer which, starting in 2023, promised to pay the
league $4 billion over ten years.1  As part of the proposed deal, MLS
would be required to institute a structure of promotion and relega-
tion.2  MLS Commissioner, Don Garber, quickly acted to diffuse the
situation by informing Riccardo Silva, founding partner of offeror
MP & Silva Group, that MLS’s contractual obligations tied to its
current deal with IMG prevented any engagement on the propo-
sal.3  Commissioner Garber did not diffuse the situation, however,
as promotion and relegation, a topic very familiar to the American
soccer community, temporarily dominated the U.S. soccer news cy-
cle.4  Indeed, the offer appeared to some as pure grandstanding
aimed at eliciting just the widespread reaction it created, which is
not altogether surprising given that Mr. Silva is an experienced bus-
inessman who had previously contracted with MLS for its television
distribution rights, and also owns Miami FC of the United States’
second-tier professional league, the North American Soccer League
(“NASL”).5  One can question the legitimacy of Mr. Silva’s media
1. See John Ourand, MLS Rebuffs Rich Offer Tied to Relegation, SPORTSBUSINESS J.
(July 24, 2017), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2017/07/
24/Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/MLS.aspx [https://perma.cc/2ANK-JHQE]
(reporting MLS turned down offer).  Compared to its current deal, signed with
IMG, the offer, no doubt, represented a potential windfall for the league, as the
league “[c]urrently . . . [is] bringing in an average of $90 million per year in do-
mestic rights . . . .” Id.; see also U.S. Soccer Partner with IMG to Market Media Rights
Until 2022, MLS PRESS BOX (Oct. 22, 2014), http://pressbox.mlssoccer.com/con-
tent/major-league-soccer-us-soccer-partner-img-market-media-rights-until-2022
[https://perma.cc/2LHA-L39H] (announcing MLS’s deal with IMG).
2. See Ourand, supra note 1 (noting promotion is prevalent in “most global R
soccer leagues”).  Throughout this article, promotion and relegation will often be
referred to as “pro/rel.”
3. See id. (quoting MLS Executive Vice President of Communications, Dan
Courtemanche, who stated MLS was neither able, nor interested).
4. See Graham Parker, Why MLS’ $4 Billion Headline Is About Forcing Uncomforta-
ble Conversations, FOURFOURTWO (July 26, 2017), https://www.fourfourtwo.com/
us/features/riccardo-silva-mls-4-billion-tv-rights-about-forcing-uncomfortable-con-
versations [https://perma.cc/Q542-3A2Y] (suggesting grandstanding and timing-
for-effect leading up to MLS All-Star Game influenced Silva’s timeline).
5. See Jeff Carlisle, Pro/Rel Component Made $4B Bid for MLS Media Rights as
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rights offer itself.6  However, his motives, which were informed by
his history of staunch advocacy for introducing promotion and rele-
gation to United States professional soccer, were doubtless to, at
the very least, add fuel to the conversation at a time when MLS
executives were holding annual meetings surrounding the MLS All-
Star Game.7
This comment explores the differences between open and
closed league structures, legal issues surrounding MLS which could
give rise to an antitrust challenge aimed at forcing it to adopt pro-
motion and relegation, and the single entity defense, the major de-
fense to such an action that MLS would undoubtedly raise.8
Ultimately, this comment concludes that due to economic and legal
factors, such a lawsuit would only come from lower-level profes-
sional soccer teams seeking entry into MLS and that such a chal-
lenge would pierce MLS’s single entity defense, thus forcing a court
to consider whether MLS violates Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act (“Sherman Act”) under a full “rule of reason” analysis.9
Essentially, given a proper plaintiff, MLS would no longer enjoy the
single entity defense upon which its structure was based when it was
founded.10
Section II will explore the American sporting landscape rele-
vant to the discussion and provide a brief history of the formations
of major American professional sports leagues before MLS, closing
at the moment immediately preceding MLS’s founding.11  Section
III will provide the legal backdrop to MLS’s formation, centering
around the Sherman Act and Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp.,12 which opened the door to a “single entity” defense to anti-
grandstanding [https://perma.cc/V276-W3GR] (“Privately, more than one MLS
source referred to what Silva is doing as grandstanding.”).
6. See id. (arguing “[i]t’s easy to make such an offer when you know the in-
tended recipient is in no position to accept”).
7. See id. (noting Silva has “been pushing for a pro/rel system to be imple-
mented in North American soccer for some time”).
8. For an accounting of the various sections of this comment, see infra notes
11–16 and accompanying text. R
9. For further discussion of these conclusions, see infra notes 238–310 and R
accompanying text.
10. For further discussion of this conclusion, see infra notes 290–310 and ac- R
companying text.
11. See infra notes 17–78 and accompanying text.  The leagues to be covered R
in this comment include Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football
League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Hockey
League (NHL), and the now-defunct North American Soccer League (“NASL”).
12. 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (providing basis for MLS’s single entity structure and
antitrust defense).  For further discussion of Copperweld, see infra notes 135–144 R
and accompanying text.
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trust litigation.13  Section IV will examine MLS’s original structure,
its early single entity victory, and consider how the single entity de-
fense has changed since then.14  Section V will consider whether
MLS could skirt a Section 1 antitrust attack by means of the single
entity defense today.15  As a result of the aforementioned analysis,
this comment will argue that MLS would likely be unsuccessful in
deploying a single entity defense in an antitrust lawsuit today, but
that such an outcome would require a specific plaintiff with a spe-
cific argument.16
II. BACKGROUND
A. Pro/Rel vs. The American Sporting Tradition
MLS operates under a closed league structure wherein the
league itself owns the teams, investors buy in to the league itself—a
single league with no promotion and relegation—and players con-
tract with league.17  This is novel in two ways: first, the majority of
major professional soccer leagues around the world are open—us-
ing promotion and relegation—and second, in the United States,
the other major leagues, while also closed, consist of individually-
owned and -operated teams both competing on and off the field
and working together economically.18  While the fact that MLS does
not use promotion and relegation is the subject of debate among
soccer fans and economists, the league is clear that it does not in-
tend to move away from its closed structure any time soon.19  As a
13. See infra notes 135–144 and accompanying text; see also The Sherman Anti- R
trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
14. For further discussion of MLS’s structure and the single entity defense,
see infra notes 180–241 and accompanying text. R
15. For further discussion of MLS and the single entity defense today, see
infra notes 242–308 and accompanying text. R
16. For further discussion of this argument, see infra notes 310–321 and ac- R
companying text.
17. For further discussion of MLS’s initial structure, see infra notes 187–201 R
and accompanying text.
18. See FIFA, GLOBAL CLUB FOOTBALL REPORT 2017 54 (2017) [hereinafter
GLOBAL CLUB FOOTBALL REPORT], https://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/foot
balldevelopment/proffootballdept/02/90/12/72/clubfootballreport_29.6.2017_
neutral.pdf [https://perma.cc/DS96-VSUZ] (noting MLS is in minority of leagues
using closed structure).  For further discussion of the structures of the other major
American professional sports leagues, see infra notes 51–64 and accompanying R
text.
19. See John Molinaro, TFC Coach Vanney: MLS Not Ready for Promotion and Rele-
gation, SPORTSNET (July 27, 2017), http://www.sportsnet.ca/soccer/tfc-toronto-fc-
greg-vanney-mls-major-league-soccer-promotion-relegation/ [https://perma.cc/
R2GJ-W9K4] (reporting “[Commissioner] Garber has long been on record as say-
ing the league has no interest in embracing” pro/rel).
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result, an interested party hoping for promotion and relegation to
come to American professional soccer would need to find alterna-
tive means to force the league to adopt such a structure, such as
antitrust litigation.20  Therefore, an examination of the landscape
into which MLS entered is necessary, as it will provide both a useful
historical sporting context and the relevant legal history concern-
ing an antitrust challenge to the league.21
1. Promotion and Relegation: A Crash Course
“Pro/rel”—the commonly used shorthand for promotion and
relegation—is a simple enough sporting concept to understand.22
In a pro/rel system, the league is divided into multiple divisions
representing different tiers of competition, and each division is
placed hierarchically above or below others based on quality of
competition.23  Teams in a given division play the other teams in
their division, and after each season is completed, a set number of
teams finishing highest in their division are “promoted” to the divi-
sion sitting immediately higher than the one in which they just fin-
ished so well.24  Conversely, an equal number of teams finishing
lowest in their division are “relegated” to the one immediately be-
low the one in which they just finished so poorly.25  As such, each
season sees each division with a different cast of teams competing
against each other as did the previous season.26  This is how profes-
sional soccer is structured in Germany, for instance, where
RasenBallsport Leipzig (“RB Leipzig”), which came in second place
out of the eighteen teams in the 2016–2017 season of the
Bundesliga—Germany’s top professional soccer division—climbed
from a regional league in the fifth division all the way to the top
20. For further discussion of possible antitrust lawsuits, see infra notes
242–308 and accompanying text (discussing possible antitrust lawsuits). R
21. For further discussion of this historical and legal history, see infra notes
22–175 and accompanying text. R
22. See J.S., The Football Pyramid in America: Why is There No Promotion and Relega-
tion in the United States?, ECONOMIST (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.economist.com/
blogs/gametheory/2016/11/football-pyramid-america [https://perma.cc/T7KQ-
MZWG] (noting “pro/rel” is preferred among Twitter users, and exploring why it
is not utilized in top-tier American soccer).
23. See Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Open Competition in League Sports,
2002 WIS. L. REV. 625, 627 (2002) (discussing open league structures).
24. See id. (explaining promotion).
25. See id. (explaining relegation).
26. See Caitlin Murray, Here Are All the Promotions and Relegations Across the [sic]
Europe’s Top Leagues, FOX SPORTS (May 29, 2017, 1:18 PM), http://www.foxsports
.com/soccer/gallery/promotion-relegation-premier-league-la-liga-bundesliga-
serie-a-ligue-1-results-table-standings-051517 [https://perma.cc/F8KL-AKPR] (list-
ing teams promoted to and relegated from top divisions in Europe’s top leagues).
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division in just seven seasons.27  But Germany is not alone in its use
of pro/rel.28  Outside of North America, “sports leagues are usually
open.”29  In the context of soccer, England, France, Spain, Ger-
many, and Italy—countries boasting high quality top divisions with
which Commissioner Garber aims for MLS, as a top-flight league, to
be compared—all operate using a pro/rel structure.30
The rise of this open structure of promotion and relegation
can be traced to the rise of professional soccer in England.31  In
1885, England first permitted professionalism in soccer, and, within
a few years, two viable leagues emerged: the Football League and
the Football Alliance.32  When the leagues eventually agreed to affil-
iate with one another in 1892, a league consisting mostly of  Foot-
ball League teams made up a first tier division, while a league
27. See Kit Holden, Why RB Leipzig Are the Most Hated Club in Germany: Owned by
Red Bull, with a Crafty Sponsor’s Name, They Have Outpriced Fan Power and Are Now
Aiming at Bayern Munich, DAILYMAIL (last updated Oct. 28 2016, 4:07 PM), http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-3599158/Why-RB-Leipzig-hated-club-
Germany-Owned-Red-Bull-crafty-sponsor-s-outpriced-fan-power-aiming-Bayern-Mu-
nich.html (documenting RB Leipzig’s rise to Bundesliga); German Bundesliga Table
- 2016–17, ESPN, http://www.espnfc.com/german-bundesliga/10/table?season=
2016 [https://perma.cc/RW4R-TXMD] (last visited Aug. 29, 2017) (listing
Bundesliga league standings, including which teams were promoted and rele-
gated); see also Jason Humphreys, Leipzig Before Red Bull: A City that Can Claim to Be
the Home of German Football, GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.theguardian
.com/football/englische-woche/2017/feb/11/rb-leipzig-red-bull-city-football-his-
tory [https://perma.cc/XC6J-C3LP] (chronicling RB Leipzig’s soccer history).  RB
Leipzig finished in first place in the NOFV-Oberliga Süd in 2009–10, amassing
twenty-two more points, nine more wins, and eighteen more goals than the second
place team in each category over a thirty-game season. See Oberliga NOFV-Süd 2009/
2010 Standings, SPORTSTATS, http://www.sportstats.com/soccer/germany/ober-
liga-nofv-sud-2009-2010/standings/ [https://perma.cc/RWR4-KZUF] (last visited
Aug. 29, 2017) (listing final standings for 2009–10 Oberliga NOFV-Süd season).
28. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 23, at 627 (discussing usage of open R
league structure).
29. Id. (“[M]embership in the league is contingent on success.”).
30. See Murray, supra note 26 (listing teams promoted to and relegated from R
top divisions in Europe’s top leagues); see also Aaron Cranford, Don Garber Insists
MLS Will Be One of World’s Best Leagues in 10 Years or Less, SBI SOCCER (Sept. 9, 2015,
7:50 PM), http://sbisoccer.com/2015/09/insists-worlds-leagues [https://perma
.cc/T37U-3LE6] (quoting Commissioner Garber, “I do believe in 10 years’ time or
less, people will think of us like Serie A, La Liga, and hopefully the way they think
about the Premier League.  If we continue to do things right and stay to our
plan”).
31. See J.S., supra note 22 (comparing early English professional soccer to R
early American professional baseball).
32. See id. (discussing “the dawn of English” soccer).  In England, what Ameri-
cans call “soccer” is called “football.” See Football, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://
en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/football [https://perma.cc/8YU2-E3VC]
(last visited Jan. 25, 2018) (“Any of various forms of team game involving kicking
(and in some cases also handling) a ball, in particular (in the UK) soccer or (in
the US) American football.”).
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consisting of mostly Football Alliance teams made up the second.33
The leagues agreed that the top teams from the second division
“would have the opportunity to ascend to the top if their perform-
ance warranted it.”34
As a result of England’s hierarchy of leagues and use of promo-
tion and relegation, the wealthier and more effectively run a team
is, the better its opportunity to purchase the services of higher qual-
ity players and coaches in order to be promoted.35  The initial,
mostly logical, economic conclusions of this are, first, that relatively
wealthier teams will tend to find themselves in higher divisions than
relatively less wealthy teams, thus creating divisions with relatively
more competition due to teams expending similar amounts of
money on players and coaches finding themselves in the same divi-
sions.36  Harkening back to the example of RB Leipzig, a key fur-
ther conclusion in favor of pro/rel and implicating antitrust
analyses of closed leagues, such as MLS, is that an investor can
purchase or create a team in a lower division and, through eco-
nomic strength and sporting merit, lead that team to the top.37  As
a result, promotion can be seen as “provid[ing] a market-based
means of permitting new entry, which will check the power of in-
cumbent clubs to exercise market power.”38
This structure of multiple divisions with meritocratic move-
ment of teams at the end of each season not only spread from En-
gland, but became recognized as the preferred structure for
professional soccer.39  The practice was even codified in the official
statutes of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA).40  FIFA, founded in Paris, France in 1904, is the interna-
33. See J.S., supra note 22 (explaining that such distinction between levels was R
possible because Football League was superior league).
34. Id.
35. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 23, at 634 (arguing teams in lower divi- R
sions are likely to be promoted if they are “from a large drawing area that will
generate revenue sufficient to support investment in a major league payroll”).
36. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 23, at 627 (arguing pro/rel “increas[es] R
effective competition among the teams in a league” and noting “[t]eams . . . rele-
gated to a lower division after an unsuccessful year will play a lower standard of
competition”).
37. See id. (“For lesser teams in lower divisions, the allure of promotion to the
top division enhances the incentive to invest in players and provides fans with new
and innovative professional league competition, distinct from and qualitatively su-
perior to the current minor leagues.”).
38. Id. (arguing pro/rel not only helps avoid monopoly leagues, but also im-
proves consumer welfare in various ways).
39. See J.S., supra note 22 (discussing history of pro/rel). R
40. See Hank Stebbins, Blind Draw: How Major League Soccer’s Single Entity Struc-
ture and Unique Rules Have Impacted Soccer in the United States, 13 WILLAMETTE SPORTS
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tional governing body which organizes “professional soccer around
the world.”41  The body organizes the quadrennial FIFA World
Cup, played by qualifying countries’ national teams, holds interna-
tional tournaments of top private club teams, and generally “regu-
lates league activity at the world level.”42  Article 9 of the FIFA
Statutes, entitled “Principle of Promotion and Relegation” and lay-
ing out the rules FIFA member organizations are required to fol-
low, begins by stating that “[a] club’s entitlement to take part in a
domestic league championship shall depend principally on sport-
ing merit.”43  It continues to state that “a club shall qualify for a
domestic league championship by remaining in a certain division
or by being promoted or relegated to another at the end of a sea-
son.”44  Further, FIFA views pro/rel not just as a matter of uniform-
ity, but as “the very essence of [soccer].”45
L.J. 1, 13 (2015); see also FIFA, FIFA STATUTES: REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE APPLI-
CATION OF THE STATUTES 73 (Apr. 2016 ed.) [hereinafter FIFA STATUTES], http://
resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/78/29/07/fifas-
tatutsweben_neutral.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEQ4-7NB9] (discussing FIFA’s
“Principle of Promotion and Relegation”).
41. Stebbins, supra note 40, at 13 (discussing FIFA’s role in MLS’s formation); R
see History of FIFA–Foundation, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/
history/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z68L-R8Y7] (last visited Feb. 11, 2018)
(discussing formation of FIFA).
42. Marc Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust and “Free Movement” Risks of Ex-
panding U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 403,
408 (2009) (noting European sports “[l]eague registration is regulated by each
sport’s governing body [such as FIFA], rather than by the clubs themselves”).  The
UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League are international club soccer
competitions administered by the Union of European Football Associations
(“UEFA”), one of FIFA’s continental federations, and the two leagues play concur-
rent to European domestic league seasons. See Europa League Explained, BARCLAY’S
PREMIER LEAGUE, https://www.premierleague.com/uefa-europa-league-explained
[https://perma.cc/YUF6-5TPN] (last visited Apr. 16, 2018).  Teams qualify for the
leagues based on their performance within their domestic leagues, with the UEFA
Champions League played by higher-finishing teams than the UEFA Europa
League. Id.  As a result, qualifying for either league is a feat of distinction.  For
further background on the UEFA Champions League, see id.  For further back-
ground on the UEFA Europa League, see From Fairs Cup via UEFA Cup to UEFA
Europa League, UEFA, http://www.uefa.com/uefaeuropaleague/history/index
.html [https://perma.cc/TVH7-JS39] (last visited Aug. 29, 2017). For a discussion
of FIFA’s role vis-à-vis MLS, see infra note 47 and accompanying text. R
43. FIFA STATUTES, supra note 40, at 73. R
44. Id.  The result is MLS “is bound by their statutes.”  Simon Grossobel, Major
League Soccer Challenged in CAS, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (Aug. 22, 2017), http://www
.sports.legal/2017/08/major-league-soccer-in-defiance-of-fifa/ [https://perma.cc/
U39E-CSW7].
45. Grossobel, supra note 44 (quoting FIFA to Tackle Areas of Concern, FIFA R
(March 12, 2008), http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2008/m=3/
news=fifa-tackle-areas-concern-709098.html [https://perma.cc/QJ4S-RDLU]).
FIFA is, indeed, the main governing body for soccer throughout the world, over-
seeing the administration of domestic leagues, international club competition, and
7
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As a result, it comes as no surprise that almost 85% of coun-
tries in the world have followed England’s lead and employ promo-
tion and relegation in their top-tier domestic leagues.46  Of
particular interest to an investigation of MLS and its structure is
that MLS, like the great leagues of Europe, is “bound by [the FIFA]
statutes.”47  Major League Soccer, however, is one of the 15% of
leagues that do not have pro/rel.48  Indeed, “MLS is probably the
most well-known example of a closed [soccer] league.”49  To the
American sports fan, however, that the United States’ top profes-
sional soccer league is in the minority by not having pro/rel might
be surprising, given the makeup of other professional sports
domestically.50
2. Major League Baseball and the American Way of Doing Things
In the United States, the major sports leagues founded before
MLS’s founding in 1995 were created as “closed leagues.”51  Base-
ball, of course, led the way.52  Shortly before the Football League
was founded in England, professional baseball was established in
the United States, and by 1900 both the National League and the
international competition—including the FIFA World Cup. See Stebbins, supra
note 40, at 13.  The United States Soccer Federation (“USSF”) governs soccer in R
the United States. See id.  The USSF is a member of the Confederation of North,
Central American and Caribbean Association Football (“CONCACAF”) and FIFA.
See What’s the Difference Between FIFA, CONCACAF, and USSF?, BACKLINE SOCCER
(Oct. 26, 2016), http://backlinesoccer.com/whats-the-difference-between-fifa-con-
cacaf-and-ussf [https://perma.cc/Y4H8-7U35].  An in-depth discussion of FIFA, its
power rules, and how they relate to MLS is beyond the scope of this comment.
However, as this comment is working on the assumption that because FIFA has
allowed MLS to exist in its current form since inception, it will continue to do so
into the future.  Further, a detailed inquiry into the ability of FIFA to institute such
a broad change in MLS would necessarily require more discussion than is prudent
in this space.
46. See Grossobel, supra note 44 (citing GLOBAL CLUB FOOTBALL REPORT, supra R
note 18, at 54). R
47. Id. (discussing “MLS and the legal framework of world [soccer]”).
48. See GLOBAL CLUB FOOTBALL REPORT, supra note 18, at 54–67) (listing all R
FIFA-recognized leagues and noting whether they use promotion and relegation).
49. Id. at 60. MLS features the largest number of teams competing in a single
league in CONCACAF, the FIFA-sanctioned governing body for the region includ-
ing the United States. See id.  Other countries with top professional soccer leagues
using a closed system include Trinidad & Tobago, the Dominican Republic, New
Zealand, San Marino, and Australia. See id. at 60, 64, 66.
50. See id. at 60 (noting closed leagues are “typical” in North America).
51. See J.S., supra note 22 (suggesting promotion and relegation “never caught R
on in America” mostly because of “historical path-dependence” by noting MLB,
NFL, NHL, and NBA).
52. See id. (comparing MLB’s rise to soccer’s rise in England).
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American League had been formed.53  But unlike in England,
where the Football League and Football Association were on differ-
ent economic footing (thus allowing the League to assume a posi-
tion dominant to the Association), America’s two foremost baseball
leagues “were roughly evenly matched economically.”54  As a result,
neither league was able to assert its supremacy over the other—
though both were able to do just that to any other baseball league
that tried to encroach on their collective fans and players—so they
“signed a peace agreement that established the World Series as a
post-season championship contest.”55  Thus, the general structure
of Major League Baseball (MLB), for purposes of this examination,
was in place.56
Early in their developmental arcs, then, MLB and professional
soccer in England had chosen separate courses, resulting in differ-
ent economic outcomes and incentives.57  As previously noted,
pro/rel arguably promotes team investment to achieve promotion,
while allowing for market-based entry by prospective owners.58
Conversely, because the two dominant leagues in American base-
ball had joined forces as a “closed” league, where additional en-
trants could only join through league expansion and not
promotion from a lower division, “MLB clubs . . . could always buy
up the most talented young players” from “their [lower revenue]
minor-league counterparts,” thus ensuring that MLB would provide
the highest quality of play, continue to earn the highest revenues,
and be able to do so at the exclusion of other teams.59
From an economic perspective, the key differences between
MLB and English professional soccer could be seen to be as follows:
(1) in English professional soccer, efficient economic investment
leads to improved results in the form of promotion from lower affil-
iated divisions to the top division; (2) in MLB, the league and its
member teams use pre-existing economic advantages to exclude
competition from potential rival clubs and leagues, which ensures
53. See Baseball Timeline, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/kenburns/baseball/time-
line/ [https://perma.cc/WZ4U-TUL7] (last visited Sept. 3, 2017) (listing 1876 as
year of National League’s founding and 1900 as year of American League’s
founding).
54. J.S., supra note 22 (discussing MLB’s early years). R
55. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
56. See id. (providing rough background on MLB for historical context).
57. See id. (comparing MLB with professional soccer in England).
58. For further discussion of initial economic conclusions related to pro/rel,
see supra notes 35–50 and accompanying text. R
59. J.S., supra note 22 (chronicling baseball’s development). R
9
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their continued economic dominance and full control over entry.60
MLB teams even doubled-down on their exclusion of “minor
league” teams from their league by creating what is commonly
called the “farm system,” which is the systematic consolidation of
multiple levels of minor league baseball for the sole purpose of de-
veloping players for the affiliated MLB team to use at its pleasure.61
The National Hockey League (NHL), National Football
League (NFL), and National Basketball Association (NBA) all fol-
lowed in the footsteps of Major League Baseball.62  Each created a
closed league system, as the NHL implemented an MLB-style farm
system which allowed it to both develop players for the NHL and try
to exclude potential rival leagues, and the NFL and NBA were able
to utilize long-since established college leagues, which took the
place of potential rival leagues, for player development.63  With
such a strong tradition of closed leagues in the United States, that
MLS is also closed comes as no surprise.64  However, to understand
why it chose its particular ownership structure, one must look at
both a previous attempt at professional soccer in the U.S., as well as
antitrust case law leading up to the formation of MLS.65
60. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 23, at 626–27 (“Because the leagues are R
almost always the sole providers of the highest quality club play in each sport, and
in North America the leagues do not face reasonable substitutes for consumers’
patronage, the closed structure also has potentially important antitrust conse-
quences.”); see also J.S., supra note 22 (arguing MLS’s owners, who control MLS R
teams, bought into the league “on the understanding they were buying into a pro-
tected club; were they suddenly to face the risk of relegation, those investments
would likely come to naught”).
61. See J.S., supra note 22 (noting this action, taken in 1930s, “formali[z]ed R
[the] hierarchy”).
62. See id. (discussing these leagues).  While the NHL was founded in 1917,
the first American team, the Boston Bruins, joined in 1924.  See Sean McIndoe,
Everything You Know Is Wrong: Original Six Edition, GRANTLAND (Mar. 25, 2014),
http://grantland.com/the-triangle/original-six-toronto/ [https://perma.cc/
A2B9-EZ4Y].  The NFL was founded in 1920. See NFL Founded in Canton, PRO FOOT-
BALL HALL OF FAME (Jan. 1, 2005), http://www.profootballhof.com/news/nfl-
founded-in-canton/ [https://perma.cc/A8EU-R2YB].  The NBA was founded, al-
beit under the name “Basketball Association of America,” in 1946. See Leonard
Koppett, The NBA—1946: A New League, NBA (Dec. 7, 2007), http://www.nba
.com/heritageweek2007/newleague_071207.html [https://perma.cc/9TTL-
D39Z].
63. See J.S., supra note 22 (noting “closed leagues prevailed” in United States). R
64. See id. (“The organi[z]ers of MLS, both in deference to local tradition and
in order to rustle up financing, adopted the American closed-league model.”).
65. See infra notes 67–175 and accompanying text (discussing North American R
Soccer League and Section 1 of Sherman Antitrust Act).
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3. The North American Soccer League
Major League Soccer is not the first major professional soccer
league in the United States.66  In 1967, the North American Soccer
League (“NASL”) was founded with the purpose of creating “such a
splash that the American public couldn’t help but get swept up” in
soccer fever.67  The league played its first season in 1968 and, in its
sixteen years, featured some of soccer’s greatest ever players.68
However, financial difficulties forced its dissolution by 1985.69  As
one critic opined, “[t]he biggest problem was with the league’s
structure.”70
Like the other top U.S. sports leagues, the NASL was a closed
league, however its being closed was not its downfall.71  Rather,
“[e]ach team was separately owned and made autonomous deci-
sions regarding player salaries and other expenditures unrestricted
by any collectively agreed upon limits,” which meant “large market
franchises with heavy financial backing . . . could splash out cash on
marquee signings, forcing their smaller market peers to try to keep
up.”72  This duality played out perhaps most acutely in
attendance.73
League attendance from 1977–83 averaged 13,000 per game.74
However, those numbers were skewed by the 28,000 average attend-
ance for the well-off New York Cosmos and the three exceptional
seasons in which they averaged 40,000 per game.75  The collapse of
the NASL can therefore reasonably be linked to both the existence
66. See supra notes 67–78 and accompanying text (discussing North American R
Soccer League).
67. Joseph Lennarz, Growing Pains: Why Major League Soccer’s Steady Rise Will
Bring Structural Changes in 2015, 16 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 137, 140 (2014).
68. See id. at 139 (“The NASL was a heady, ambitious undertaking featuring
nationally televised games on network stations and legendary names on the field:
Carlos Alberto, Georgio Chenaglia, Franz Beckenbauer, Johan Cruyff.”).
69. See id. at 139–41 (chronicling NASL’s rise and fall); see also NASL 1968–84:
A Review of the Golden Era, NASL [hereinafter NASL 1968-84], http://www.nasl
.com/a-review-of-the-golden-era [https://perma.cc/HPZ5-WF87] (last visited Sept.
5, 2017) (chronicling NASL’s rise and fall).
70. Lennarz, supra note 67, at 140. R
71. See id. at 140–41 (noting NASL’s problems that led to its collapse).  For
further discussion of the NASL’s collapse, see infra notes 72–76 and accompanying R
text.
72. Lennarz, supra note 67, at 140.  In the NASL, “player salaries . . . reached R
70% of league revenues, compared with just 40% in the” NFL in 1983. Id. at 141.
73. See NASL 1968–84, supra note 69; see also infra notes 74–75 (discussing R
NASL attendance figures).
74. See NASL 1968–84, supra note 69 (providing attendance figures for NASL’s R
final years).
75. See id. (noting New York Cosmos’ ability to draw large crowds).
11
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of rich teams on the one hand and poor teams on the other, and
the overall “financial toll that attracting high-caliber international
players took on teams.”76  No doubt, in addition to the almost-cen-
tury of precedent for closed league structure, what certainly
weighed heavily in the minds of MLS’s founders was the failed, al-
beit glamorous, experiment that was the NASL.77  So when FIFA
granted the United States Soccer Federation (“USSF”) the right to
host the 1996 FIFA World Cup (in part by USSF promising it would
create a top-flight soccer league), MLS’s founders aimed to create a
league with financial parity, “strict financial control,” and power ac-
cumulated in a strong central league office which would ensure
that the league, not the individual teams, would determine the
league’s fate.78
B. Legal Backdrop to MLS
As noted, MLS’s founders endeavored to structure the league
in such a way that the league itself would retain maximum control
over all aspects of the league.79  The idea was that doing so would
allow MLS to expand methodically and on its own terms while mini-
mizing the market factors that plagued the NASL—particularly
those relating to player contracts.80  This scenario seemed ideal, but
it was also one the major North American professional sports
leagues, with the exception of the MLB, had found impossible to
accomplish because of adverse antitrust litigation rulings.81  As a re-
76. Stebbins, supra note 40, at 14 (“Teams ended up paying too much for R
talent and ended up running out of money.”); see also Lennarz, supra note 67, at R
142 (suggesting “overextension . . . doomed the NASL”).
77. See Stebbins, supra note 40, at 14 (asserting MLS’s “investors took note of R
the failure of the NASL and instituted a salary-cap, stringent player acquisition
devices, and a cap on international players in an effort to avoid the same fate as the
NASL”); see also Lennarz, supra note 67, at 142 (providing context for MLS’ found- R
ing and legal structure).
78. Brad McChesney, Comment, Professional Sports Leagues and the Single Entity
Defense, 6 SPORTS L.J. 125, 143 (1999) (examining MLS’s founders’ aims when cre-
ating it).
79. See id. (discussing MLS’s power over individual teams’ decisions, revenue
sharing, and player contracts and movement); see also infra notes 77–78 and accom- R
panying text.
80. See McChesney, supra note 78, at 142–43 (“The organizers of MLS wanted R
to avoid the problems that plagued and eventually destroyed the NASL.  To maxi-
mize effectiveness, the start-up league sought to avoid disparity in the financial
stability of team owners, maintain strict financial control and gain economies of
scale in purchasing power, offer a league-wide integrated marketing program, con-
trol all major aspects of team operations and locations and to enforce salary caps
consistent with United States law.”).
81. See Steven Bank, Should MLS Players Skip the Strike and Sue Instead?, AMERI-
CAN SOCCER NOW (Mar. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Bank, Should MLS Players Skip], http:/
12
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sult, then-USSF President and MLS founder, Alan Rothenberg, and
his team needed to find a way to ensure such litigation would not
stop their fledgling league in its tracks.82  MLS’s founders deter-
mined that creating something that would skirt antitrust litigation
based on a single entity defense was the best approach.83  In short,
the founders of MLS would create their new league’s structure to
comply with the Supreme Court’s decision in Copperweld Corp. v. In-
dependence Tube Corp., which opened the door to such an
approach.84
1. The Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act
Due to concerns related to massive business growth in the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century, Congress passed the Sherman
Act in 1890 “to prevent price-fixing arrangements and monopoliza-
tion.”85  Section 1 of the Act states that “[e]very contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is hereby declared to be illegal.”86  The purpose of Section 1
is to address “price fixing, wage fixing, tying arrangements, market
allocations, and concerted refusals to deal (group boycotts).”87
Sports leagues often find themselves subject to Section 1 scrutiny
/americansoccernow.com/articles/should-mls-players-skip-the-strike-and-sue-in-
stead [https://perma.cc/KHJ8-7WHE] (noting antitrust suits forced NBA, NFL,
and NHL to allow free agency to players).  The author also notes that in MLB,
antitrust litigation also paved the path to free agency, although there, Curt Flood
lost a case challenging MLB’s reserve clause. See id.  For further discussion of re-
serve clauses, see infra note 159 and accompanying text. R
82. See Stebbins, supra note 40, at 13–14 (discussing factors considered during R
MLS’s formation).
83. See id. at 12 (“Rothenberg created the league as a single entity so that it
would be exempt from antitrust challenge and be able to control labor costs.”); id.
at 13–14 (discussing factors considered during MLS’s formation); see also Fraser v.
Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 132 (D. Mass. 2000) [hereinafter
Fraser I] (“[Rothenberg] also consulted antitrust counsel in the hope of avoiding
the antitrust problems which other sports leagues . . . had encountered.”), aff’d 284
F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002).
84. See Stebbins, supra note 40, at 15 (“Based on legal appearances, it seems R
that the MLS is running things from a single centralized office as necessitated by
Copperweld.”); see also Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752, 778 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Today the Court announces a new per
se rule: a wholly owned subsidiary is incapable of conspiring with its parent under
[Section] 1 of the Sherman Act.”).
85. Edelman & Doyle, supra note 42, at 411. R
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
87. Edelman & Doyle, supra note 42, at 412–13 (“The danger combated by R
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, then, is concerted action that reduces consumers’
freedom of choice.”).
13
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because the Act applies to labor markets as much as it does product
markets.88
The Clayton Antitrust Act (“Clayton Act”) was passed in 1914
to bolster the Sherman Act, and of relevance to a discussion of MLS
are Sections 6 and 7.89  Section 7 forbids mergers and acquisitions
which have the effect of “substantially . . . lessen[ing] competition,
or . . . creat[ing] a monopoly.”90  Section 6 provides a statutory ex-
emption to Section 1 of the Sherman Act for labor unions and
union members “act[ing] within the legitimate objectives of the
union.”91  Section 7, therefore, logically expands upon the earlier
Sherman Act’s prohibitions, whereas Section 6 is aimed at allowing
and promoting collective bargaining, a key aspect of modern pro-
fessional sports in the United States.92
a. Application of Sherman and Clayton to U.S. Professional
Sports, Generally
From a cursory reading of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, one
can appreciate that the major professional sports leagues in the
United States, all of which operate with a closed structure, might
run into trouble.93  This is true despite the fact that the Supreme
Court has recognized sports as a unique setting in which the coop-
eration of independently-operated teams, which might otherwise be
illegal for being “conspiracies in restraint of trade,” is actually nec-
essary for the operation of the league and therefore subject to less
stringent scrutiny than other industries.94  Within the context of
professional team sports, some “horizontal restraints on competi-
tion,” which would otherwise doom an antitrust defendant, “are es-
sential if the product is to be available at all.”95
88. See id. at 413 (discussing Section 1 analysis, generally).
89. See id. at 411, 415 (explaining U.S. competition law with respect to sports
and soccer specifically). See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (rep-
resenting codification of Clayton Act).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (representing codification of Section 7 of Clayton Act).
91. Edelman & Doyle, supra note 42, at 415; see also § 17 (representing codifi- R
cation of Section 6 of Clayton Act).
92. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 42, at 415 (“This exemption was de- R
signed to further congressional policy favoring collective bargaining.”).
93. See Stebbins, supra note 40, at 6 (citing Ross & Szymanski, supra note 23, at R
628) (“Every major professional team sports league in the United States has been
charged with monopolistic behavior.”).
94. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 23, at 639 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Ath- R
letic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. 468 U.S. 85 (1984) [hereinafter
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Okla.]) (noting Section 1 analysis is different for sports
leagues than for other industries).
95. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Okla., 468 U.S. at 101; see also Robert M. Bern-
hard, MLS’ Designated Player Rule: Has David Beckham Single-Handedly Destroyed Major
14
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However, the result of such a realization is not automatic ex-
emption from antitrust examination.96  This is despite the fact that
perhaps the most poignant example of a league being granted lati-
tude in an antitrust suit comes in the form of the MLB’s antitrust
exemption.97  In 1922, the Supreme Court held, in Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs
(“Federal Baseball”),98 that the league did not violate Section 1 be-
cause it was not engaging in interstate commerce, which is a prereq-
uisite for violation.99  However, the Court’s ruling in Federal
Baseball—sixty years before articulating the necessity of some hori-
zontal restraints on trade in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma100—not only did not mention
teams’ need for horizontal restraints on competition, but also is
unique to baseball and has not been applied to other professional
sports leagues.101  Instead, courts consider the quality of a league’s
restraint on trade within a given market to determine whether it
passes the threshold necessary to have violated antitrust laws.102
League Soccer’s Single-Entity Defense?, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 413, 415 (2008) (cit-
ing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Okla., 468 U.S. at 101–03) (“[T]he Supreme Court has
recognized that the essence of sports is producing competition.”).
96. See Bernhard, supra note 95, 415–16 (discussing rule of reason analysis R
being employed due to special nature of sports); see also infra note 102 and accom- R
panying text (suggesting rule of reason analysis is preferred).
97. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1922) (holding baseball games were “purely state
affairs” and team travel to and from games was “a mere incident, not the essential
thing”).
98. 259 U.S. 200 (1992).
99. See id. at 209 (“That which in its consummation is not commerce does not
become commerce among the States because the transportation that we have men-
tioned takes place.”).
100. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
101. See Stebbins, supra note 40, at 6 (citing Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 200) R
(noting that courts have held NBA, NFL, and NHL violated antritrust laws, but that
“[b]aseball holds a unique exemption from antitrust law because, in a widely di-
vided decision, the Supreme Court held that professional baseball did not involve
interstate commerce”).  The Court made its ruling despite the league having teams
in multiple states, and even though those teams needed to travel from one state to
another to exhibit baseball games.
102. See Bernhard, supra note 95, at 415 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of R
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–03 (1984)) (“These recognitions have caused courts to
forego traditional per se antitrust analysis in favor of the rule of reason.”); see also
infra notes 103–111 and accompanying text. R
15
Ewing: MLS Promotion! Can MLS's Single Entity Status Protect It from "Pr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\25-2\VLS205.txt unknown Seq: 16 26-JUN-18 12:33
374 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25: p. 359
b. Section 1 Analyses: Per Se and the Rule of Reason
Courts have used two analyses to determine whether a sports
league has violated Section 1.103  First, is a per se analysis which is
employed for “agreements . . . so consistently unreasonable that
they may be deemed to be illegal per se, without inquiry into their
purported justifications.”104  The per se analysis can be seen, there-
fore, as a shortcut for courts, reserved for those cases where parties
engaged in “agreements or practices which because of their perni-
cious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue” do
not require any “elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they may
have caused or the business excuse for their use.”105  This analysis,
however, seems to be falling out of favor, as a second analysis, a
“rule of reason” test, has prevailed recently.106
A rule of reason analysis considers the following: (1) the
league’s “market power”; (2) whether the “anticompetitive effects
. . . exceed any pro-competitive justifications” for the league’s ac-
tion; and (3) resulting harm to the challenger.107  That it has come
to be the favored test seems logical.108  As previously noted, courts
have recognized the need for leagues to engage in some concerted
action in restraint of trade in order to properly function as sports
leagues.109  This is in line with what some commentators have de-
scribed as “changing ideas in industrial economics” which “cast
doubt on traditional notions about competitive effects.”110  How-
103. See infra notes 104–111 and accompanying text (discussing Section 1 R
analyses).
104. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976) (suggesting per se
illegality emerged “[a]s . . . courts gained experience with antitrust problems aris-
ing under the Sherman Act”).
105. Id. (quoting N. Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)); see also
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“A [p]er se rule
is a judicial shortcut; it represents the considered judgment of courts, after consid-
erable experience with a particular type of restraint, that the rule of reason [as]
the normal mode of analysis can be dispensed with.”).
106. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 42, at 414 (arguing “courts are moving R
away from applying the per se test”); see also, e.g., Fraser v. Major League Soccer,
284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Fraser II]; N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL,
670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter NASL v. NFL]; Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619.
107. Edelman & Doyle, supra note 42, at 414.  Edelman and Doyle argue that R
both the rule of reason and a “quick look or truncated Rule of Reason” analysis
exists, but that courts employ the “full” rule of reason test more often. Id.
108. For further discussion of why the rule of reason analysis is favored, see
infra notes 109–110 and accompanying text. R
109. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Okla. 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984)
(“[W]hat is critical is that this case involves an industry in which horizontal re-
straints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.”).
110. Edelman & Doyle, supra note 42, at 414 (quoting Marc Edelman & C. R
Keith Harrison, Analyzing the WNBA’s Age/Education Requirement from a Legal, Ethical,
16
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ever, even if a league might otherwise succumb to a Section 1 attack
based on a rule of reason analysis, three exemptions give them ad-
ded protection.111  These exemptions are the “single entity” de-
fense, the “statutory labor” exemption, and the “non-statutory
labor” exemption.112
2. Single Entity Defense and Related Case law
Of greatest relevance is the single entity defense, which, when
successfully argued, acts as something of an exemption for leagues
engaging in behavior seemingly in violation of Section 1.113  The
single entity defense finds its roots in the idea that “[i]t is funda-
mental in a Section 1 violation that there must be at least two inde-
pendent business entities accused of combining or conspiring to
restrain trade” within a defined economic market.114  The Supreme
Court’s 1984 decision in Copperweld is the leading case defining the
defense; however leagues had attempted to argue their teams were
part of a “single business enterprise” before then, though largely to
no avail.115
A rare example of a successful single entity defense is San Fran-
cisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League,116 where an NHL team
sued the NHL for refusing to allow it to relocate, and alleged viola-
tions of both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act.117  The
United States District Court for the Central District of California
held, first, that the relevant market was “the production of profes-
sional hockey games before live audiences” in the U.S. and Ca-
and Cultural Perspective: Women, Men, and the Professional Sports Landscape, 3 NW J.L.
& SOC. POL’Y 1, 14 (2008)) (noting “all joint ventures are reviewed exclusively
under the Rule of Reason”).
111. See, e.g., id. at 415–17 (discussing statutory labor exemption and non-
statutory labor exemption); Stebbins, supra note 40, at 6–22 (discussing single en- R
tity defense); see also infra notes 113, 145, and 148 and accompanying text (discuss- R
ing exemptions to Section 1).
112. For further discussion of the single entity defense, the statutory labor
exemption, and the non-statutory labor exemption, see infra notes 113–175 and R
accompanying text.
113. See Bernhard, supra note 95, at 416–17 (describing single entity defense); R
see also McChesney, supra note 78, at 139 (arguing MLS could successfully argue R
single entity early on in its existence).
114. San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
115. See id. (holding NHL teams “act[ed] together as one single business en-
terprise” in “producing sporting events”); see also Bernhard, supra note 95, at 419 R
(noting importance of Copperweld decision).
116. 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
117. See id. at 967 (listing relevant facts).
17
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nada.118  Within this market, the court found that the Seals did not
compete with other NHL teams, but, rather, acted with them as
“one single business enterprise” in the pursuit of the league’s main
purpose in this market, which was to produce “sporting events of
uniformly high quality appropriately scheduled as to both time and
location so as to assure all members of the league the best financial
return.”119
However, the District Court’s finding in San Francisco Seals
proved to be counter to the run of cases.120  In North American Soccer
League v. NFL (“NASL v. NFL”),121 the NASL brought an action
challenging an NFL rule banning “cross-ownership” of NFL teams
by owners of teams in other major leagues.122  The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit did recognize that the various NFL
teams needed to cooperate, classifying the league as an unincorpo-
rated joint venture, but conducted a rule of reason analysis and
found that the ban violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.123  Key to
the court in NASL v. NFL was that: (1) each NFL team was sepa-
rately owned, (2) they did not share expenses, expenditures, or
118. Id. at 969.  The court looked to two Supreme Court cases to guide its
definition of the relevant market:
In considering what is the relevant market for determining the control of
price and competition, no more definite rule can be declared than that
commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same pur-
poses make up that part of the trade or commerce, monopolization of
which may be illegal.
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956)).
[W]ithin this broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in
themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes.  The
boundaries of such a submarket may be determined by examining such
practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a
separate economic entity, the product’s peculiar characteristics and uses,
unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity
to price changes, and specialized vendors.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 325 (1962)).
119. Id.  The court held that the league of teams cooperating as a single en-
terprise for the production of professional hockey games itself competed against
“other similarly organized professional leagues.” Id.
120. For further discussion of cases in which the single entity defense was not
successfully employed, see infra notes 121–144 and accompanying text. R
121. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
122. See id. at 1250 (detailing NASL’s action and case’s posture).
123. See id. at 1250–51 (discussing NFL’s structure and court’s holding); see
also Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir.
1984) (citing NASL v. NFL, 670 F.2d at 1257–59) (“[The Second Circuit] recog-
nized the cooperation necessary among league members, even characterizing the
NFL as a joint venture, but nonetheless applied rule of reason analysis and found
the cross-ownership rule violated [Section] 1.”).
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profits with each other, (3) each earned its own revenue from un-
shared sources, such as television, radio, parking, and concessions,
and (4) each charged different amounts for tickets.124  As a result,
the court held that the NFL teams were “separate economic entities
engaged in a joint venture,” because, although the league did en-
gage in a revenue sharing scheme, “the financial performance of
each team, while related to that of the others, [did] not . . . necessa-
rily rise or fall with that of the others.”125  The court stressed the
need to find that the NFL was not a single entity, warning that do-
ing so “would permit league members to escape antitrust responsi-
bility for any restraint entered into by them,” even if “the benefit
would be outweighed by its anticompetitive effect.”126  Worse still,
the court worried that such a finding might allow restraints
“adopted more for the protection of individual league members
from competition than to help the league.”127
The Ninth Circuit furthered the Second Circuit’s reasoning in
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL (“Raiders I”),128 a
case which involved a similar situation to that in San Francisco Seals,
but specifically rejected its holding.129  The NFL prevented the
Oakland Raiders’ proposed relocation by requiring a three-fourths
vote of the league’s team owners, who unanimously voted against
the relocation.130  In analyzing whether the NFL was a single entity,
the court noted that the teams needed to cooperate to produce a
product—“the NFL season culminating in the Super Bowl”—but
nonetheless held that such a need is insufficient to exempt cooper-
ating businesses from Section 1 scrutiny.131
Following a similar analysis to that used in NASL v. NFL, the
Ninth Circuit also noted that teams compete against each other “to
acquire players, coaches, and management personnel.”132  Further,
certain teams in close proximity compete for “fan support, local tel-
124. See NASL v. NFL, 670 F.2d at 1252 (listing economic particularities of
NFL teams).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1257.
127. Id.
128. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Raiders I].
129. See id. at 1390 n.4 (“One district court case has reached the opposite
conclusion in a somewhat similar context.”).
130. See id. at 1385 (discussing factors causing Raiders to file lawsuit).
131. Id. at 1389 (“The necessity that otherwise independent business cooper-
ate has not, however, sufficed to preclude scrutiny under [Section] 1 of the Sher-
man Act.”).
132. Id. at 1390.
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evision and local radio revenues, and media space.”133  As a result
of the foregoing, the court, citing the emergence of the United
States Football League, which was in the middle of its second of
only three seasons in existence, found that each team was a sepa-
rate entity “in large part distinct from the NFL,” and that each club
was able to produce football games without being a member of the
NFL.134
As deploying a single entity defense increasingly seemed a fu-
tile exercise to sports leagues by the mid-1980s, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Copperweld must have seemed a potential breath
of new life for the defense.135  In Copperweld, the Court considered
whether a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary could
“constitute a combination or conspiracy” in such a way that would
violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.136  In doing so, the Court first
looked to the language of the Sherman Act, and then a growing
number of cases in which courts had created an “intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine,” a court-created doctrine which stated liability
under Section 1 “is not foreclosed merely because a parent and its
subsidiary are subject to common ownership.”137
The Court’s analysis, however, lead it to conclude that the doc-
trine had grown beyond its true scope.138  As a case in point, the
Supreme Court in 1947 had held that a taxicab company owner had
violated Section 1 when he acquired multiple taxicab companies in
multiple cities, stating “the common ownership and control of the
various corporate appellees are impotent to liberate the alleged
combination and conspiracy from the impact of the Act.”139  Courts
jumped on this language to build the intra-enterprise doctrine;
however this legal conclusion somehow became separated from the
facts that brought it about.140  The key was that the original acquisi-
tions themselves “create[d] a combination illegal under [Section]
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Stebbins, supra note 40, at 9 (“After Copperweld leagues consistently R
made the argument that a league is a single entity.”).
136. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 759 (cit-
ing 15 U.S.C. § 1) (questioning whether “[t]he so-called intra-enterprise conspir-
acy doctrine,” which allows Section 1 violations by parents and subsidiaries “subject
to common ownership”).
137. Id. (noting intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine was based on Supreme
Court “declarations”).
138. See id. at 760–61 (considering case law examples to illustrate).
139. Id. at 760 (quoting United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227–28
(1947)).
140. See id. (“The passage as a whole, however, more accurately stands for a
quite different proposition.”).
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1,” and that the various companies shared common ownership was
of no consequence “because restraint of trade was the primary ob-
jective of the combination, which was created in a deliberate, calcu-
lated manner.”141  Conversely, and relevant to the parties in the
case it was deciding, the Court held that “[b]ecause coordination
between a corporation and its division does not represent a sudden
joining of two independent sources of economic power previously
pursuing separate interests, it is not an activity that warrants [Sec-
tion] 1 scrutiny.”142  Therefore, the Court concluded, Section 1
does not forbid “a single firm’s anticompetitive conduct,” whether
or not that conduct “may be indistinguishable in economic effect
from the conduct of two firms subject to [Section] 1 liability.”143
Only Section 2, which forbids monopolization and attempted mo-
nopolization, may apply.144
3. Labor Exemptions to Section 1 and Related Case Law
As previously mentioned, Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides
a statutory exemption to Section 1 for collective bargaining.145  The
exemption applies to union organizations and members “acting
within the legitimate objectives of a union,” meaning “union mem-
bers must act collectively in their own self-interest for legitimate
union purposes, and not in combination with non-union or third
party groups.”146  The exemption, however, only applies to the
union’s actions, “and not the relationship between an employer
and the union members.”147
Of more relevance to a potential challenge to MLS, and Sec-
tion 1 challenges against sports leagues in general, is the so-called
“non-statutory labor exemption,” which is based in common law.148
The non-statutory exemption has the same effect as the statutory
141. Id. at 761–62 (citations omitted) (stating original intent of acquisition, as
evidenced by subsequent action, allowed for such ruling).
142. Id. at 770–71 (holding single entity defense applied).
143. Id. at 775 (determining single firms may restrain trade in ways separate
firms may not).
144. See id. (“[T]he Act’s plain language leaves no doubt that Congress made
a purposeful choice to accord different treatment to unilateral and concerted
conduct.”).
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (representing codification of Section 6 of Clayton
Act); see also supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. R
146. Edelman & Doyle, supra note 42, at 415 (citing § 17) (introducing Sec- R
tion 6’s statutory labor exception).
147. Id. at 415 n.80 (quoting Andreas Joklik, The Legal Status of Professional
Athletes: Differences Between the United States and the European Union Concerning Free
Agency, 11 SPORTS L.J. 223, 239 (2004)).
148. See id. at 415–16 (arguing for its “important place” in sports law).
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exemption, but can apply to additional situations, thus filling in
some of the gaps.149  The exemption, applied pursuant to what is
known as the “Mackey test,” is articulated by the Eighth Circuit in
the 1976 case Mackey v. NFL,150 and “applies only where an alleged
restraint of trade: (1) involves mandatory subjects of bargaining;
(2) primarily affects the parties involved; and (3) is reached
through bona fide, arm’s-length bargaining.”151  In 2004, the Sec-
ond Circuit in Clarett v. NFL152 opted for an expanded non-statutory
labor exemption which includes “any mandatory subject of bargain-
ing where the exemption’s application would ensure the successful
operation of the collective bargaining process.”153  Unlike the
Mackey test, this broader test, which came to be known as the Clarett
test, will ultimately protect collective bargaining agreements
(CBAs) that negatively affect parties who were not involved in the
bargaining of that agreement, but who are controlled the CBA by
later entry to the bargained-for labor market as a covered class.154
As a result, where Mackey might not have afforded an exemption to
a CBA negatively affecting college players not yet in the league like
Maurice Clarett, the Clarett test does provide an exemption.155  In
any event, that a court will employ either the relatively narrower
Mackey test or the relatively broader Clarett test is evidence that the
non-statutory labor exemption holds a prominent position in sports
149. See id. at 416 (“The non-statutory labor exemption comes for the public
policy rationale that ‘employees are better off negotiation together rather than
individually, and therefore labor law (rather than antitrust law) should apply to
situations where collective bargaining occurs.’”) (quoting Edelman & Harrison,
supra note 110, at 14). R
150. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
151. Edelman & Doyle, supra note 42, at 416 (citing Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614) R
(noting “many courts have followed the Mackey Test”).
152. 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
153. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 42, at 417 (quoting Clarett, 369 F.3d at R
143) (internal quotations omitted).
154. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139 (holding “an NFL club would commit an un-
fair labor practice were it to bargain with [a prospective player coming out of col-
lege] individually without the union’s consent,” and that “[t]he terms and
conditions of [that player’s] employment are instead committed to the collective
bargaining table and are reserved to the NFL and the players union’s selected
representative to negotiate”) (first citing Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 678, 180 (1944); and then citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
175, 180 (1967)); see also Edelman & Doyle, supra note 42, at 416–17 (discussing R
Clarett test).
155. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138–39 (holding rule collectively bargained be-
tween NFL and NFL Players’ Association—forbidding college players with less than
three full college football seasons played—from playing in NFL exempted under
non-statutory labor exemption).
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antitrust litigation.156  The reason for this is strong policy-based sup-
port for allowing employees to organize and use their collective
strength to negotiate the terms of their employment, and the fact
that the labor markets in the major U.S. professional sports consists
of “players’ associations (unions) collectively bargain[ing] with
teams (employers) to form a leagues collective bargaining
agreement.”157
This policy-based rationale for the non-statutory labor exemp-
tion can be seen in lawsuits where players have challenged contract-
related restraints which impinge on their ability to pursue employ-
ment opportunities on the open market within the league, whether
or not the court ended up finding for the league or the player.158
Many of the earlier challenges attacked reserve clauses, provisions
of the player contract which effectively decreased the player’s ability
to test the open market by “restricting the athlete’s right to change
teams, even after the contract expires.”159
For instance, in Mackey, the Eighth Circuit held that, under a
rule of reason analysis, though not under a per se analysis, the
NFL’s “Rozelle Rule” “constitue[d] an unreasonable restraint of
trade,” thus violating Section 1.160  The rule, in the interest of main-
taining competitive balance on the field, allowed the NFL’s Com-
missioner to compensate a team losing a player to another through
free agency—reached at the conclusion of the player’s contract—
by awarding the original team a player from the new team if the two
teams were unable to find an agreeable arrangement on their
own.161  The players contended, however, that the effect of the rule,
which was a form of reserve clause, was to chill the market for play-
156. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 42, at 415–16 (arguing non-statutory R
exemption “has an important place in sports law”).
157. Id. at 416.
158. See Bank, Should MLS Players Skip, supra note 81 (recapping player-initi- R
ated lawsuits aimed at reserve clauses).
159. Reserve Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
160. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1).  The court did, however, suggest that some “restraint[s] on competition for
players’ services” might not violate Section 1. See id.
The Rozelle rule is named after Pete Rozelle, the [then] N.F.L. commis-
sioner, because he put[ ] it into effect.  It require[d] a team signing a
player who had made himself a free agent to compensate that player’s
former team by means of players and/or draft selections.  Should these
teams be unable to agree, then Rozelle arbitrate[d] the matter, fixing the
compensation.
William N. Wallace, Rozelle Rule Found in Antitrust Violation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31,
1975), http://www.nytimes.com/1975/12/31/archives/rozelle-rule-found-in-anti-
trust-violation-rozelle-rule-judged-in.html?pagewanted=all.
161. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610–11 (discussing Rozelle Rule).
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ers who had exercised contract options in order to reach free
agency.162
Although the rule was technically the result of collective bar-
gaining between the league’s teams and the players, the court
found it was not subject to the non-statutory labor exemption, be-
cause the NFLPA was relatively weak at the time, thus precluding
bona fide, arms-length bargaining, which is the third prong of the
Mackey test.163  The court’s reasoning for this conclusion was three-
fold: (1) the NFLPA was both new and underfunded relative to the
teams with which it was bargaining, (2) the rule had been in place
before the NFLPA had organized, and remained unchanged when
agreed to by the NFLPA, and (3) there was no quid pro quo bene-
fiting the players for its remaining so.164  Indeed, although Mackey
resulted in a successful antitrust challenge, the key in its holding
was that the court found the non-statutory labor exemption did not
apply.165
Unfortunately, for players seeking to challenge league rules re-
stricting their ability to pursue contracts on the open market, courts
have applied the exemption to a wide range of challenges.166  Ex-
amples include where the parties to the agreement are those af-
fected by the restraint, “when the challenge is brought by an
employee or potential employee while a [CBA] . . . is in place . . . or
when the restraint . . . was unilaterally imposed by management
during an impasse in collective bargaining relations.”167  In Wood v.
162. See Wallace, supra note 160 (explaining players’ original contention R
when case was at trial court level).
163. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615–16; see also supra note 151 and accompanying R
text (stating three prongs of Mackey test).  The reason the court found no bona fide,
arms-length bargaining was (1) the Rozelle Rule had been in place before the
NFLPA had organized, (2) the NFLPA was both new and underfunded relative to
the teams, (3) the Rule was unchanged when agreed to by the NFLPA, and (4)
there was no quid pro quo for its remaining so. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615–16.
164. See id. at 616 (detailing factors for holding non-statutory labor exemp-
tion did not apply).
165. See id. (“In view of the foregoing, we hold that the agreements between
the clubs and the players embodying the Rozelle Rule do not qualify for the labor
exemption.  The union’s acceptance of the status quo by the continuance of the
Rozelle Rule in the initial collective bargaining agreements under the circum-
stances of this case cannot serve to immunize the Rozelle Rule from the scrutiny of
the Sherman Act.”).
166. For further discussion of instances where courts apply non-statutory la-
bor exemption, see infra note 167 and accompanying text. R
167. Lennarz, supra note 67, at 147 n.22 (citing Brown v. Pro Football Inc., R
518 U.S. 231 (1996); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bd. of Elec.
Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); and Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
aff’d, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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National Basketball Ass’n,168 for instance, the Second Circuit consid-
ered the NBA entry draft—wherein teams select college players to
play for their team and receive exclusive rights to employ the player
for a period of time—and salary cap, which is the maximum
amount a team can spend on player salaries during a given sea-
son.169  The court held that both fell within the non-statutory labor
exception because both were “mandatory subjects of bargaining,”
achieved through “bona fide arms-length negotiations” between the
leagues teams and the NBA Players’ Association (“NBAPA”).170
That the plaintiff, Wood, was not personally part of the NBAPA
when these provisions were bargained for was of no help to Wood,
as the court stressed the policy of promoting collective bargain-
ing.171  As a result, the non-statutory labor exemption has allowed
leagues to restrict the labor market within the leagues themselves in
ways which otherwise could violate Section 1 because the rules chal-
lenged came about through collective bargaining.172
In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,173 players challenged a rule unilat-
erally imposed by the NFL’s teams during a collective bargaining
impasse which created development teams of substitute players who
would be paid a set salary.174  The Supreme Court held that non-
statutory labor exemption applied to the teams’ rule, because uni-
lateral employer action taken during or after a collective bargaining
negotiation grows “out of, and [i]s directly related to, the lawful
operation of the bargaining process” when the action “involve[s] a
matter that the parties were required to negotiate collectively” and
“concern[s] only the parties to the collective-bargaining
relationship.”175
168. 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
169. See id. at 526 (detailing Wood’s allegations of Section 1 violations).
170. Id. at 528 (adopting Mackey test).
171. See id. at 529 (“Indeed the law could be no other way.  The aim of federal
labor policy is to promote peace in labor-management relations, not chaos and
turmoil which adoption of plaintiff’s theory would produce.”).
172. See supra notes 148–166 and accompanying text (discussing non-statutory R
labor exemption).
173. 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
174. See id. at 234–35 (noting plaintiffs included development players who
argued they should be allowed to negotiate salaries individually).
175. Id. at 250.  The Court noted, however, that “an agreement among em-
ployers could be sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collec-
tive-bargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not
significantly interfere with that process.” See also Erick V. Prosser, Casenote, Brady
v. NFL: How the Eighth Circuit “Saved” the 2011 NFL Season by Supporting Negotiation,
Not Litigation, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 603, 615 (2012) (concluding “decertifica-
tion is an attempt by the Players to end their collective bargaining relationship . . .
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III. ANALYSIS
With the legal, economic, and historical background in place,
a framework for MLS’s formation could be crafted.176  As a result of
the founders’ planning, the league was able to thwart a legal chal-
lenge to its single entity status early in its existence.177  However, as
discussed below, developments since this early case, in addition to
the precariousness of the case itself, have left the league vulnerable
to another Section 1 attack.178  Ultimately, if raised by the proper
plaintiff, the challenge would be able to successfully penetrate
MLS’s single entity defense, thus forcing a court to employ a full
rule of reason analysis under Section 1.179
A. MLS Joins the Scene and Scores a Quick Victory,
but Will It Stand?
In light of the foregoing, and with the benefit of hindsight, the
economic and legal history of soccer and organized professional
team sports, in general, in the United States provided a fairly clear
path for Alan Rothenberg and the other founders of MLS.180  Gen-
erally, professional sports in the U.S. had evolved employing closed-
league systems, wherein any affiliated leagues existed solely for
player development purposes, young talent was initially acquired by
means of an entry draft, and players’ unions collectively bargained
with the owners of the leagues’ independently-owned and -operated
teams.181  Specific to soccer, the NASL had been the most success-
ful, and certainly the most glamorous, attempt at a top-tier league
in the United States; however, issues with wealth disparity, overex-
and bring an antitrust lawsuit challenging the [league’s] rules and bargaining tac-
tics under the Sherman Act”).
176. For further discussion of MLS’s initial structure, see infra notes 187–201 R
and accompanying text.
177. For further discussion of MLS’s successful use of the single entity de-
fense, see infra notes 202–220 and accompanying text. R
178. For further discussion of these developments, see infra notes 221–309 R
and accompanying text.
179. For further discussion of this conclusion, see infra notes 290–309 and R
accompanying text.
180. See Tyler A. Coppage, Comment, Taking the Training Wheels off MLS: Why
the Single Entity Antitrust Exemption Should No Longer Apply, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
545, 546 (2015) (“All success stories build from lessons learned in failure, and MLS
is no different.”).
181. For further discussion of the development of professional sports in the
United States, see supra notes 51–63 and accompanying text R
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tension in the signing of star player contracts, and lack of cohesion
plagued the league to the point of collapse.182
In the legal realm, the Sherman Act, specifically Section 1,
loomed over the other major sports leagues—with the exception of
the MLB—keeping them from exerting centralized power in a way
that would not allow them to fully control the entire business of the
league.183  That the players of the other leagues unionized and col-
lectively bargained with the leagues offered a certain level of pro-
tection from the Sherman Act, but leagues were still subject to
scrutiny under Section 1.184  Lastly, leagues had largely been unable
to execute a full Section 1 single entity defense, although with the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Copperweld, the criteria for how to do so
was now apparent.185  So, when the United States was granted the
1996 FIFA World Cup along with a requirement that it create a top-
tier league, the fact that Rothenberg’s group suggested creating a
single entity pushed his bid to the top.186
1. MLS’s Early Structure
MLS organized in 1995 as a limited liability company (LLC) in
Delaware, with its operational structure laid out in its LLC Agree-
ment (“MLS Agreement”) and each team owned by the league it-
self, as opposed to separate parties.187  As such, investors hoping to
be part of the league invest in the league itself and are given the
option of either investing passively in the league as a whole or being
182. For further discussion of the NASL, see supra notes 67–76 and accompa- R
nying text. See also Stebbins, supra note 40, at 14 (noting other unsuccessful R
leagues such as the American Soccer League, the International Soccer League, the
United Soccer Association, and the National Professional Soccer League).
183. For further discussion of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012), see
supra notes 85–111 and accompanying text. R
184. For further discussion of the statutory and non-statutory labor exemp-
tions, see supra notes 145–175 and accompanying text. R
185. For further discussion of the single entity defense, see supra notes
113–144 and accompanying text. R
186. See Stebbins, supra note 40, at 13 (“It is important to note two things R
here: (1) it is documented that a major reason the USSF selected the bid from the
MLS group was because of its unique structure that would keep costs down while
preventing antitrust challenges, and (2) that FIFA and the USSF only allowed one
sanctioned Division 1 professional league in the United States.”).
187. See Remo Decurtins, Major League Soccer’s Exceptionalism in FIFA’s Transfer
System: For How Much Longer?, 27 MARQ. SPORT L. REV. 331, 333 (2017) (stating
MLS was “structured . . . as an entity of separately operated units (“single entity
structure”) in the legal form of a limited liability company . . . with the units being
individual MLS teams”); see also Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 132–33 (D. Mass. 2000)
(outlining relevant MLS structure for antitrust challenge examination), aff’d 284
F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002); McChesney supra note 78, at 143 (“Technically, the league R
owns all of the teams.”).
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granted “investor-operator” status with “the exclusive right to oper-
ate one or several MLS teams,” subject to conditions and obliga-
tions, by signing an operating agreement.188  Each investor then
receives a seat on the league’s Management Committee, charged
with “manag[ing] the business and affairs of MLS.”189  As investors
have two investment options, not every team needs to be operated
by a specific investor through an operating agreement, meaning
MLS itself is capable of directly operating teams.190
Unlike in NASL v. NFL, profits and losses are shared amongst
the investors, insuring each investor, and each team, as an organiza-
tional unit, is interested in the health of the league.191  The league
also  receives all revenue, “owns and controls all trademarks, copy-
rights, and other intellectual property rights,” “receives the reve-
nues from ticket sales;” regulates ticket policies, pays most of the
league’s operational expenses, pays costs related to players, and
pays for every team’s “game-related travel expenses, . . . league wide
marketing expenses, and 50% of each individual team’s stadium
rental expense.”192  Additionally, “the league owns all [national and
international] broadcast rights, intellectual property rights, stadi-
ums and other facilities, and sources of revenue like concessions
and merchandizing deals.”193
As for labor, because the league owns every team, “players con-
tract[ ] directly with the league,” meaning all player contracts are
MLS contracts, as opposed to contracts with a given team.194  As a
result, a player first signs an MLS contract, and then the league
188. Decurtins, supra note 187, at 333 (detailing MLS’s initial and current R
structure).
189. Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 132. “The Management Committee has author-
ity to manage the business and affairs of MLS,” which included, inter alia, setting
guidelines for player assignments.  Id.
190. See id. at 132 n.2 (“The league itself is authorized by the MLS Agreement
to operate teams directly and . . . [as of April 2000] operates two teams.”).
191. See Decurtins, supra note 187, at 333 (“The individual investors thus have R
a direct economic interest in the financial well-being of the league as a whole.”).
For further discussion of NASL v. NFL, see supra notes 124–125 and accompanying R
text.  MLS’s profits and losses distribution operates “not unlike the distribution of
dividends to shareholders in a corporation.” Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 133.
192. Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 133 (listing specifics relating to MLS’s eco-
nomic and operational structure relevant to antitrust challenge).
193. Lennarz, supra note 67, at 142.  This bundle of ownership, and centrali- R
zation of resources, lays in stark contrast to those the NASL v. NFL court used in
making its determination of a Section 1 violation. See NASL v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249,
1252 (2d Cir. 1982); supra note 124 and accompanying text. R
194. Lennarz, supra note 67, at 142 (arguing MLS’s structure allowed for fi- R
nancial stability, defense against antitrust challenges, and a positive relationship
with USSF).
28
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol25/iss2/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\25-2\VLS205.txt unknown Seq: 29 26-JUN-18 12:33
2018] MLS PROMOTION! 387
assigns him to a team.195  The majority of players are selected by the
investor-operators of specific teams, however, to foster competitive
balance on the field, MLS itself distributes the best players evenly
throughout the league.196
Pursuant to their operating agreement, teams’ investor-opera-
tors are given some control over their teams’ specifically local af-
fairs, such as agreements for local broadcasts, services, and
products—although the league curtailed even this control—and
the investor-operators execute this power “as agents of MLS,” as op-
posed to separate entities.197  Investor-operators are required to pay
for the costs of these approved local arrangements, as well as team
administration—including coaches and general managers—and
half of their stadium rental expenses not covered by MLS.198  For
their trouble, MLS awards investor-operators a management fee,
which gives them a portion of revenues from “local broadcast[s] . . .
and sponsorship,” ticket sales, and “concessions and other sources”
of stadium-related revenue.199  Investor-operators also may transfer
or sell their rights, however such action requires Management Com-
195. Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 132 (“[P]layers are hired by MLS as employees
of the league itself and then are assigned to the various teams.  Each player’s em-
ployment contract is between the player and MLS, not between the player and the
operator of the team to which the player is assigned.  MLS centrally establishes and
administers rules for the acquisition, assignment, and drafting of players, and all
player assignments are subject to guidelines set by the Management Committee.
Among other things, the guidelines limit the aggregate salaries that the league may
pay its players.”).
196. See id. at 132–33; see also Decurtins, supra note 187, at 332–33 (“In order R
to create competitive balance in the interest of the league as a whole, the central
resource ‘players’ would have to be allocated by the league.”).  Additionally, teams
could trade players, although each trade required the express approval of the
league’s central office. See Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 133.
197. See Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 133 (“Team operators do retain the ability
to negotiate some purely local matters.”).
198. See Decurtins, supra note 187, at 333 (“Among others, they are obliged to R
hire, at their own expense and discretion, the coaches and other staff.”); see also
McChesney, supra note 78, at 143 (suggesting investor-operators “have a financial R
stake in their respective team, but possess little decision making power. In addi-
tion, teams have a local manager and advisory committee which advises MLS man-
agement regarding local operating matters”).
199. Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 133.
As of the time this action was filed, the management fee consisted of (a)
100% of the first $ 1.24 million, and 30% of the excess over $ 1.24 mil-
lion, of local television broadcast and sponsorship revenues, the latter
percentage subject to some specified annual increase; (b) 50% of ticket
revenues from home games, increasing to 55% in year six of the league’s
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mittee consent, which “may be withheld without cause.”200  Passive
investors, meanwhile, have neither the responsibilities nor the op-
portunities related to team operation, and receive only their por-
tion of the league’s shared revenue.201
2. Fraser: A Game Winner for Single Entity?
a. A Goal for Single Entity
As noted, this league structure was designed to allow MLS to
defend against a Section 1 antitrust attack by utilizing the single
entity defense.202  The league had an early opportunity to defend
against such a lawsuit, when a group of players sued the league,
asserting violations of Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, as well as
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.203  The players attacked the league’s
direct control over player contracts and movement, alleging “an il-
legal conspiracy between multiple entities” sufficient to be an un-
reasonable restraint on trade “in the market for top division soccer
players in North America,” in violation of Section 1.204  Essentially,
200. Id. (“Team operators derive whatever rights they may have exclusively
from MLS, and the league may terminate these rights if a team operator violates
these provisions or fails to act in the best interest of the league.”).
201. See id. (“Passive investors do not pay any team operating expenses or re-
ceive any management fee.  They share in the general distribution of profits (and
losses) resulting from league operations.”).  For further discussion of MLS profit
sharing, see supra note 191 and accompanying text. R
202. See Lennarz, supra note 67, at 144 (noting that, theoretically, organizing R
MLS as a single entity “would remove any restraints on competition inherent in the
MLS model from scrutiny . . . because there is a unity of entrepreneurial interests
among the teams”).
203. See generally Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130 (holding MLS is a single entity for
purposes of Section 1, and sufficient injury and market definitions were not al-
leged for Section 7 victory); Fraser II, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002) (upholding lower
court’s holdings on relevant market grounds).
204. Lennarz, supra note 67, at 148 (citing Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 132) R
(focusing on how MLS “negotiate[ed] and execut[ed] contracts directly with play-
ers before determining which team they would play for”).
The plaintiffs assert a number of antitrust claims.  In Count I, they allege
that MLS and several of its investors who operate MLS teams (hereafter
“operator-investors” or “operators”) have unlawfully combined to restrain
trade or commerce in violation to § 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1, by contracting for player services centrally through MLS, effec-
tively eliminating the competition for those services that would take place
if each MLS team were free to bid for and sign players directly.  In Count
II, the plaintiffs assert as a second § 1 claim that all the defendants
have conspired to impose anticompetitive “transfer fees” on player reloca-
tion that have the effect of restricting the ability of soccer players to move
from one team to another, thus dampening competition for players’ ser-
vices worldwide.  Count III alleges that all defendants have jointly exer-
cised monopoly power in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2.  In Count IV, the plaintiffs allege that the transaction which brought
MLS into existence violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.  Fi-
30
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the players alleged that although the league and its teams were
technically operating as a single LLC and, therefore, appeared eligi-
ble for Copperweld’s single entity defense, this structure was merely
single entity in appearance, while actually consisting of separate le-
gal entities collectively acting to horizontally restrict trade.205
The United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts disagreed with the players, however, and granted summary
judgment for the league.206  The court held that “MLS’s operations
should . . . be analyzed as the operations of a single corporation . . .,
with its operator-investors treated essentially as officers and share-
holders.”207  In making this conclusion, the court found that
“[u]nder Delaware law, an LLC is a separate legal entity distinct
from its members,” that those members’ “own undivided interests
. . . are bound by the terms of their Agreement . . . and share in the
overall profits and losses ratably according to their investment or as
otherwise provided by the organizing Agreement.”208  The court
also noted that “[t]he Federal Trade Commission has treated LLCs
like corporations,” and held that MLS, an LLC, should be treated as
a corporation for purposes of the inquiry.209  Invoking Copperweld,
the court held that MLS was a single entity, and that as such, the
individual investors were incapable of “combin[ing] or con-
spir[ing] with each other in pursuing the economic interests of the
entity.”210
nally, the plaintiffs assert in Count V a California state law claim that cer-
tain contracts concerning players’ promotional rights were unlawful
contracts of adhesion.  The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive re-
lief as well as damages.
Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 131–32.
205. See Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 131–32 (“The gist of [plaintiffs’] argument
is that although MLS appears to be a single business entity, so that its method for
hiring players centrally can be characterized as the act of a single economic actor
for antitrust purposes, the organizational form is really just a sham that should be
considered ineffective to insulate from condemnation what are in substance illegal
horizontal restraints on the hiring of players resulting from the unlawful concerted
behavior of the several MLS team operators.”).
206. See id. at 142 (granting summary judgment on counts I and IV).
207. Id. at 135 (holding single entity defense applied to MLS).
208. Id. at 134 (discussing why members of LLCs are members of single en-
tity, not separate entities working together).
209. Id. at 135.  The court further noted that Section 1 “is directed against
contracts, combinations or conspiracies,” and as such “only prohibits collective ac-
tivity by plural economic actors which unreasonably restrains competition.” Id. at
134 (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769
(1984)).
210. Id. at 139.  “MLS’s policy of contracting centrally for player services is
unilateral activity of a single firm.  Since § 1 does not apply to unilateral activity—
even unilateral activity that tends to restrain trade—the claim set forth in Count I
31
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b. Fraser I Goes Under Review
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit never produced a holding on single entity, because it held
that under a rule of reason analysis, the players insufficiently de-
fined the relevant market for restraint on trade, thereby making a
single entity ruling unnecessary.211  However, in dicta, the court ap-
peared willing to reverse the District Court’s holding on single en-
tity.212  According to the court, “MLS does resemble an ordinary
company,” but that appearance is inconclusive, and instead of be-
ing a single company under Copperweld, MLS seems more “a hybrid
arrangement.”213  The court pointed to two main distinctions.214
First, the court found a “diversity of entrepreneurial interests that
goes well beyond the ordinary company,” stemming from the inves-
tor-operator operating agreements which, according to the court,
takes the investor-operators “part way along the path to ordinary
sports team owners,” because they have personal economic interests
in the individual teams they operate separate from the league and
the other investors.215  Based on this diversity, the court seemed to
view the league’s structure as being merely formally different than
that of other sports leagues—which are not single entities—as op-
posed to actually different.216  The court reached this conclusion
based on language in Copperweld stating that a parent company and
cannot succeed as a matter of law.” Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Copperweld, 467
U.S. at 776).
211. See Fraser II, 284 F.3d 47, 59 (1st Cir. 2002).  The First Circuit held that
the players were required to show “MLS exercised significant market power in a
properly defined market, that the practices in question adversely affected competi-
tion in that market and that on balance the adverse effects on competition out-
weighed the competitive benefits.” Id. (citing Augusta News Co. v. Hudson News
Co., 269 F.3d 41, 49 (1st Cir. 2001)).
212. See id. at 56 (“We also find that the case for applying single entity status
to MLS and its operator/investors has not been established but that in this case the
jury verdict make a remand on the Section 1 claim unnecessary.”); see also Decur-
tins, supra note 187, at 335 (arguing MLS’s single entity status received a “question R
mark” from the First Circuit).
213. Fraser II, 284 F.3d. at 56, 58 (suggesting MLS fits “somewhere between a
single company (with or without wholly owned subsidiaries) and a cooperative ar-
rangement between existing competitors”).
214. See id. at 57 (suggesting two “two functional differences” exist “that are
significant for antitrust policy”).
215. Id.  The court pointed to the fact that the investor-operators, with re-
spect to the teams they operate, make independent hires, personally invest in their
teams, keep a substantial share of revenue from their teams, and “[have] limited
sale rights in [their] own team that relate to the specific assets and not just shares
in the common enterprise.” Id.
216. See id. (“One might well ask why the formal difference in corporate struc-
ture should warrant treating MLS differently than the National Football League or
other traditionally structured sports leagues.”).
32
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its wholly-owned subsidiaries are single entities under Section 1,
and that they share a “complete unity of interests.”217
Second, the court expressed concern that the investor-opera-
tors, in also sitting on the Management Committee, are not the
“mere servants of MLS” that subsidiaries of a parent company
would normally be, but rather those in actual control of the league,
because they represent “the majority of votes on the [Commit-
tee].”218  The court’s concern was a policy-based one: allowing a
single entity defense for independent entrepreneurs collaborating
to fix prices (player wages, for instance) just because they were
technically operating under a single corporate entity—of which
they were in actual control—would protect “mere front[s] for price
fixing.”219  After considering these differences, the court concluded
that MLS “present[ed] a more doubtful situation” than that in Cop-
perweld, but in any event held that it need not answer questions
about single entity, due to the players’ aforementioned failure to
sufficiently define the relevant market.220
c. American Needle Changes the Rules
With the First Circuit deciding Fraser II on relevant market
grounds, one might have reasonably believed that the District
Court’s single entity holding would serve as ample protection for
MLS, but the District Court’s ruling itself does not represent an
ironclad application of the single entity defense for every vertically
integrated sports league.221  However, despite the fact that the Dis-
trict Court held that MLS was a single entity, it also cited dictum in
Copperweld that could reasonably lead to the conclusion that if the
individual actors within a single entity were to act in their own eco-
nomic self-interest, rather than the interest of the entity itself, the
217. See id. (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467
U.S. 752, 771 (1984)).  The court did not decide, however, whether “unity of inter-
est” was a legal requirement, or a factual statement made by the Copperweld court.
See id. (citing Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1996)).
218. Id. (“MLS . . . has two roles: one as an entrepreneur with its own assets
and revenues; the other (arguably) as a nominally vertical device for producing
horizontal coordination, i.e., limiting competition among operator/investors.”).
219. Id. at 57–58 (refusing to go so far as to say MLS was such a price fixing
front, but arguing “it does distinguish Copperweld by introducing a further danger
and a further argument for testing it under [S]ection 1’s rule of reason”).
220. Id. at 58 (suggesting courts would need to decide how to analyze such
situations).
221. See Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 135 (D. Mass. 2000) (recognizing a poten-
tial “independent personal stake” exception to single entity defense), aff’d 284 F.3d
47 (1st Cir. 2002).
33
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defense might be excepted.222  Indeed, in the text the District
Court cites, the Copperweld Court notes that “many courts have cre-
ated an exception [to single entity] for corporate officers acting on
their own behalf.”223  But while the District Court recognized some
“independent personal stake” exemption to the single entity de-
fense, it hesitated to decide on its breadth, preferring instead to
note its existence and suggest it should be applied
“conservatively.”224
As a result, one commentator, interpreting a Seventh Circuit
case subsequent to Copperweld and decided in the same year as
MLS’s inaugural season, concluded that Copperweld perhaps does
not stand for the proposition that all action by purported single
entities is given the defense, but, rather, that it “applies to a particu-
lar set of facts.”225  In that case, Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v.
NBA,226 the Chicago Bulls and a national broadcast television sta-
tion sued the NBA to allow the station to air Bulls games, while the
NBA sought to limit the number of games the station would air and
impose a “tax” on these broadcasts.227  The Seventh Circuit, invok-
ing the now well-established notion that sports leagues require
some level of cooperation between its member teams to produce its
product, decided there was “no reason . . . a sports league cannot
be treated as a single firm,” but hedged this with respect to the
NBA— a closed league of individually owned and operated teams—
by noting “the league looks more or less like a firm depending on
222. Id. (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 770 n.15 (dictum)) (suggesting single
entity defense is unavailable when officers “act[ ] to promote an interest, from
which they would directly benefit, that is independent from the corporation’s suc-
cess”); see also Greenville Publ’g Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399–400
(4th Cir. 1974) (finding defendant newspaper corporation and its president “capa-
ble of conspiring under § 1 because president had a stake in a third newspaper
which would directly benefit from plaintiff’s newspaper’s elimination”).
223. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 770 n.15 (citations omitted).
224. Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 135 (citations omitted).
225. McChesney, supra note 78, at 142 (arguing that in 1999 (before Fraser I) R
MLS could successfully invoke single entity).  McChesney argued that “[a]s long as
the league can show a unity of interest, it can not [sic] be capable of conspiring
within the meaning of [S]ection 1,” and suggested that the factors to consider
under Copperweld are “common objectives versus divergent economic interests,
general guidelines determined by one consciousness rather than two, and a pre-
existing unity of economic interest rather than the sudden joining of sources of
power, previously pursuing divergent goals.” Id. (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at
770–72).
226. 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
227. See id. at 595–96 (considering whether NBA was single entity when acting
within broadcast market).
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which facet of the business one examines.”228  Ultimately, however,
the court held that within the realm of the broadcast market, the
NBA was more a single entity than a group of independent eco-
nomic actors, and, as a result, single entity would protect it from a
Section 1 inquiry.229
In 2010, the Supreme Court revisited Copperweld in the context
of professional sports in American Needle, Inc. v. NFL.230  The NFL’s
member teams had created a separate entity called National Foot-
ball League Properties (“NFLP”) to handle their intellectual prop-
erty business, wherein profits and losses were shared equally by the
teams, and teams had the ability to withdraw from the agree-
ment.231  NFLP entered into an exclusive licensing agreement with
Reebok, and another company, American Needle, who had previ-
ously been authorized to create clothing with teams’ logos, sued.232
Almost immediately, the Court brought the Fraser I District Court
ruling into question, stating it has “long held that concerted action
under [Section] 1 does not turn simply on whether the parties in-
volved are legally distinct entities,” and that what is required is “a
functional consideration of how the parties involved in the alleged
anticompetitive conduct actually operate.”233  The Court stated that
what is important is not whether the parties are a “legally single
entity,” but rather “whether the alleged contract, combination . . .,
or conspiracy is concerted action—that is, whether it joins together
separate decisionmakers.”234
228. Id. at 598–99 (stating “NBA Basketball is one product from a single
source,” but that “because the human capital of players is not readily transferable
to other sports . . . the league looks more like a group of firms acting as a monop-
sony”).  For further discussion of courts’ realization that sports leagues require
some level of cooperation, see supra note 94 and accompanying text. R
229. See id. at 600 (“[W]e conclude that when acting within the broadcast
market the NBA is closer to a single firm than to a group of independent firms.”).
Of course, a successful single entity defense only protects against a Section 1 in-
quiry, and not a Section 2 inquiry, and the court noted that to succeed on that
front, the plaintiffs needed to “establish[ ] that the NBA possesses power in a rele-
vant market, and that its exercise of this power has inured consumers.” Id.
230. 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
231. See id. at 187 (considering whether this entity deserved single entity
protection).
232. See id. (“American Needle alleg[es] that the agreement between the
NFL, its teams, NFLP, and Reebok violated [Sections] 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.”).
233. Id. at 191 (“eschew[ing] such formalistic distinctions” of legal
distinction).
234. Id. at 195 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Copperweld Corp. v. In-
dependence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984)).  In the related text in Cop-
perweld, the Court states that “it is perfectly plain that an internal agreement to
implement a single, unitary firm’s policies does not raise the antitrust dangers
35
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Therefore, the test articulated in American Needle for determin-
ing whether the single entity defense applies is “whether there is a
‘contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy’ amongst ‘separate eco-
nomic actors pursuing separate economic interests,’ such that the
agreement ‘deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmak-
ing,’ and therefore of ‘diversity of entrepreneurial interests,’ and
thus of actual or potential competition.”235  As a result, the Court
seemed to echo the First Circuit’s concern that a broad application
of the defense would allow for separate economic decision-makers
to hide behind the formality of a single legal entity.236  Of course,
the Court noted that finding a single firm’s agreements not covered
by single entity is more the exception than the rule, but that it is
possible nonetheless.237  As a result of this analysis, the Supreme
Court held that NFLP was not protected by the single entity de-
fense, thus opening it to scrutiny under Section 1, “at least with
regard[ ] to its marketing of property owned by the separate
teams.”238  The Court cited the fact that the individual NFL teams
each owned their own intellectual property and had the ability to
withdraw from the entity agreement to conclude that they would
otherwise compete with each other to profit from their intellectual
property.239  Essentially, because NFLP’s actions were decided by
that Section 1 was designed to police.” Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769 (internal quota-
tions omitted).
235. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at
769 and Fraser II, 284 F.3d 47, 57 (1st Cir. 2002).
236. See id. at 200 (“Agreements made within a firm can constitute concerted
action covered by [Section] 1 when the parties to the agreement act on interests
separate from those of the firm itself, and the intrafirm agreements may simply be
a formalistic shell for ongoing concerted action.”).  For further discussion of the
First Circuit’s concern in Fraser II, see supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text. R
237. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 200 (“We generally treat agreements within a sin-
gle firm as independent action on the presumption that the components of the
firm will act to maximize the firm’s profits.  But in rare cases, that presumption
does not hold.”).
238. Id.
The Court focused on seven factors: that the NFL teams were indepen-
dently owned, independently managed with separate corporate con-
sciousness whose objectives are not common, that the teams compete
with each other on the playing field, compete to attract fans, compete for
gate receipts, compete for contracts with players and coaches, and that
the teams had the potential to compete for their separately owned intel-
lectual property.
Matthew J. Jakobsze, Comment, Kicking “Single-Entity” to the Sidelines: Reevaluating
the Competitive Reality of Major League Soccer After American Needle and the 2010 Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement, 31 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 131, 146 (2010) (citing Am. Needle,
560 U.S. at 196–97).
239. See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 200 (“Apart from their agreement to cooper-
ate in exploiting those assets, including their decisions as the NFLP, there would
be nothing to prevent each of the teams from making its own market decisions.”).
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the teams, the teams themselves owned their own intellectual prop-
erty, and the teams would otherwise profit off of their own intellec-
tual property and compete with each other for related revenue in
doing so, by deciding to “license their separately owned trademarks
collectively and to only one vendor . . . [they] deprive[d] the mar-
ketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking.”240  In light of
American Needle, therefore, the requirements necessary for unity of
interest seem more strict than perhaps MLS’s founders anticipated,
potentially paving the way for a reconsideration of the league’s sin-
gle entity status.241
B. Challenging Single Entity to Institute Pro/Rel
Even before American Needle, some commentators argued that
MLS was not actually a single entity, and momentum grew after the
decision.242  These arguments focus on a number of economic fac-
tors and structural changes and evolutions that arguably decrease
the league’s unity of purpose under Copperweld and American Nee-
dle.243  With respect to MLS and pro/rel, the effects of these
changes point in the direction of MLS no longer being eligible for
single entity status.244  And while one set of commentators argues
that the other major sports could be subject to “open competition
as a remedy,” its relatively early analysis with respect to MLS’s his-
240. Id. at 197 (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769).  The Court added that if
separate economic entities could avoid Section 1 scrutiny “simply by giving the
ongoing violation [of Section 1] a name and label” by means of a collectively or-
ganized legal entity, “perhaps every agreement and combination in restraint of
trade could be so labeled.”  Id. (quoting Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951)).
241. See Coppage, supra note 180, at 555–56 (“Although American Needle dealt R
with licensing for products and merchandise, the holding could potentially serve
to create far more stringent requirements for determining what unity of interest
means in a league governance context.”).
242. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 23, at 626 n.104 (arguing First Circuit’s R
discussion of MLS’s single entity status was correct, focusing on investor-operators’
actual control of league through Management Committee); see also Lennarz, supra
note 67, at 195 (“Since Fraser, there are three developments stemming from league R
growth that weaken the alleged single entity status further” which has increased
teams’ “identities as separate entities and weakening their legal claim to a com-
plete unity of interest that would allow the league’s structure to fall under” Cop-
perweld); Stebbins, supra note 40, at 4 (“The league’s current economic reality R
makes it vulnerable to an antitrust challenge.”); Coppage supra note 180, at 559–61 R
(arguing growth and league changes should no longer afford MLS single entity
defense).
243. See, e.g., Lennarz, supra note 67, at 194–95 (focusing on three things: R
“the increased diversity of MLS’ operator-investor cadre, the Designated Player ex-
ception, and the proliferation of soccer-specific stadiums”).
244. For further discussion of MLS’s precarious position vis-à-vis the single
entity defense, see infra notes 282–309 and accompanying text. R
37
Ewing: MLS Promotion! Can MLS's Single Entity Status Protect It from "Pr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\25-2\VLS205.txt unknown Seq: 38 26-JUN-18 12:33
396 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25: p. 359
tory—written in 2002—does not offer complete guidance on
whether MLS could, by injunction, be forced to adopt pro/rel.245
This section will discuss possible challenges to MLS’s single entity
status, beginning with a challenge from the players, continuing to a
challenge from an MLS shareholder, and ending with a challenge
from a team currently playing at a level below MLS.246  Ultimately, a
successful challenge to single entity, as well as Section 1, could
come only from a lower-level club seeking entry to MLS.247
1. Another Players’ Challenge
The league has undergone significant changes since Fraser,
some of which call into question the league’s unity of purpose with
regard to player acquisitions.248  Assuming the players were to file a
Section 1-based lawsuit against MLS, as they did in Fraser, the mar-
ket they would allege to have been restricted would necessarily be a
labor market involving their services.249  Such a challenge would
likely focus on two key developments: the Designated Player Rule,
and the recent creation of a modified free agency system.250
The Designated Player Rule came about in 2006, in advance of
English soccer star David Beckham signing with MLS’s LA Gal-
axy.251  The rule “allows clubs to acquire up to three players whose
total compensation and acquisition costs exceed the maximum
budget charge, with the club bearing financial responsibility for the
amount of compensation above each player’s budget charge.”252
245. Ross & Szymanski, supra note 23, at 646 n.104 (arguing early on that R
Fraser “poses no obstacles to the imposition of open competition as a remedy for
the major North American sports” other than MLS, but restricting any discussion
of MLS to one footnote designed at making this point).
246. For further discussion of potential challenges, see infra notes 248–309 R
and accompanying text.
247. For further discussion of a lower-level club challenge, see infra notes
290–309 and accompanying text. R
248. For further discussion of these changes and a potential player suit, see
infra notes 249–281 and accompanying text. R
249. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010) (considering chal-
lenge brought by former licensee of intellectual property within market for teams’
“individually owned intellectual property”).
250. See infra notes 251–268 and accompanying text; see also Lennarz, supra R
note 67, at 168 (“[T]here is only ever a single MLS team who can offer the player a R
contract which minimizes the impact of potential demand for the player from
other MLS teams.”); Coppage, supra note 180, at 558 (“The . . . perhaps more R
serious change to the single entity immunity is the expansion of the Designated
Player Rule.”).
251. See Lennarz, supra note 67, at 151 (noting Designated Player Rule was R
introduced in 2006 and is often referred to as “the Beckham rule”).
252. MLS Designated Players, MLS COMMUNICATIONS (Jan. 1, 2017, 12:00 PM),
https://www.mlssoccer.com/glossary/designated-player.
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Typically, teams are capped insofar as how much they can “spend”
on salaries for their team as a whole—a typical salary cap—and how
much they can spend on individual player salaries.253  As previously
discussed, players usually contract with MLS, not individual
teams.254  The Designated Player Rule is one mechanism the league
has introduced to allow investor-operators to personally pay more
than the salary of a set number of players without the excess salary
counting against the salary cap.255  As a result, whereas most players
are assigned to a team in the sole interest of league balance,
“[d]esignated [p]layers are usually free to choose their MLS team
themselves.”256  For example, when U.S. Men’s National Team
player Clint Dempsey returned to MLS in 2013, he expressed inter-
est in playing in Seattle, Los Angeles, and Toronto, and, while each
team expressed interest in signing him, Dempsey signed in
Seattle.257
Under American Needle, this rule—illustrated by the cases of
Beckham, Dempsey, and others—arguably decreases teams’ unity
of interest, because it is an example of investor-operators acting as
individual actors working in their own self-interest, shielded only by
the front of MLS unity.258  In Dempsey’s case, although his contract
was negotiated by an MLS executive working in his capacity with the
league, the general framework of a player picking their team is
more typical of non-single entity leagues, and while the decision to
send Dempsey to Seattle was presented as best for the league, some
MLS investor-operators expressed confusion as to why Dempsey
would not be subject to the league’s usual allocation process.259  If,
as was the case in American Needle, teams would otherwise compete
253. See MLS Roster Rules and Regulations, MLS COMMUNICATIONS (Feb. 1, 2017,
11:00 AM), https://www.mlssoccer.com/league/official-rules/mls-roster-rules-and-
regulations (“The maximum budget charge for a single player is $480,625.”).
254. For further discussion of MLS’s early labor structure, see supra notes
194–196 and accompanying text. R
255. See MLS Designated Players, supra note 252 (“In 2017, a Designated Player R
that is 24 years old or older during the league year will carry the Maximum Budget
Charge ($480,625) unless the player joins his club after the opening of the Secon-
dary Transfer Window, in which case his budget charge will be $240,312.”).
256. Decurtins, supra note 187, at 348 (discussing international transfers to R
MLS, generally).
257. See Grant Wahl, How Seattle’s Stunning Clint Dempsey Deal Got Done, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.si.com/soccer/2013/08/05/clint-demp-
sey-seattle-sounders-mls [https://perma.cc/3GNZ-JXZP] (chronicling Dempsey’s
return to MLS).
258. See Stebbins, supra note 40, at 24–25 (arguing Designated Player Rule R
exemplifies teams acting with entrepreneurial self-interest).
259. See Wahl, supra note 257 (quoting league official, “I think this signing will R
be helpful to everybody in the league”).
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in profiting off of their intellectual property, if not for the existence
of NFLP, then surely the Designated Player Rule indicates that
teams not only would potential compete with each other for play-
ers, but are already actively doing so.260
The 2015 CBA also brought about a new form of free agency
for MLS, which offered players who are twenty-eight years old and
have played in the league for at least eight years the opportunity to
pursue employment on a different team for a capped increase in
salary.261  On the surface, the existence of free agency might also
support a finding that teams are now competing with each other for
the services of skilled players, decreasing their unity of interest by
engaging in bidding wars.262  However, the mechanism the league
and players bargained for, in capping pay increases and limiting the
player pool to players with a long tenure, likely does not push the
needle away from single entity.263  For example, one commentator
suggests MLS’s free agency is like that of another single entity—the
University of California—where all ten campuses are owned by the
Regents of the University of California, which “employ[s] all faculty
and staff system-wide.”264  There, tenured professors may move
from one campus to another, and various campuses may try and
260. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 198 (2010) (holding NFL
teams “are . . . profit-maximizing entities, and their interests in licensing team
trademarks are not necessarily aligned”) (citations omitted); see also Stebbins, supra
note 40, at 25 (“Teams that can afford a high-level DP perform markedly better on R
the field and reap financial rewards off of the field.”).
261. See Jason Davis, The Start of Free Agency in MLS, US SOCCER PLAYERS (Dec.
9, 2015), https://ussoccerplayers.com/2015/12/the-start-of-free-agency-in-mls
.html [https://perma.cc/RLQ2-MBBH] (noting, however, that “bidding wars
don’t appear to be in the offing, but there could be multiple teams interested in
the same player”); see also Steven Bank, Who Won the MLS Labor Negotiations? Single
Entity, AMERICAN SOCCER NOW (Mar. 5, 2015, 10:07 AM) [hereinafter Bank, Who
Won Negotiations], http://americansoccernow.com/articles/who-won-the-mls-la-
bor-negotiations-single-entity [https://perma.cc/ES6H-26HF] (“The deal allows
free movement, but it doesn’t let different divisions of the single entity artificially
bid up the price in the absence of independent evidence of market value via an
offer from outside of the single entity.”).
262. See Bank, Who Won Negotiations, supra note 261 (arguing full unrestricted R
free agency and restricted free agency require “economically independent teams
bidding on a player to establish his market price”).
263. See id. (arguing MLS’s free agency “does nothing to establish the eco-
nomic independence of the teams and therefore likely does not threaten the sin-
gle-entity defense”).
264. Steven Bank, UCLA Faculty Voice: To Solve Labor Conflict in Major League
Soccer, Look to UC, UCLA NEWSROOM (Feb. 26, 2015) [hereinafter Bank, UCLA
Faculty Vote], http://newsroom.ucla.edu/stories/ucla-faculty-voice-to-solve-labor-
conflict-in-major-league-soccer-look-to-uc [https://perma.cc/3HXE-WMLX]; see
also Bank, Who Won Negotiations, supra note 261 (suggesting University of California R
has its own, similar form of free agency).
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lure those tenured professors away from their current campus.265
However, “the recruiting campus . . . can only offer a salary increase
of one step on the university’s salary scale . . . [which is] typically
not enough to induce a move on its own.”266 In addition, the cam-
pus where the tenured professor previously taught “has the oppor-
tunity to match that . . . increase to help induce the professor to
remain,” though the campuses may not bid higher than the prede-
termined salary increase.267  MLS’s free agency system, therefore,
appears to mirror the University of California’s and other single
entities’ businesses, allowing for a very limited, predetermined
amount of competition between teams on an equally limited num-
ber of older—usually less desirable—players, and as such more
likely would not result in a court determining the teams had lost
their unity of interest within the market for player services.268
Whether or not these labor market factors would push the
league into Section 1 scrutiny and out of the protection of single
entity, however, the players themselves would not, realistically,
bring a challenge to court.269  As previously discussed, the non-stat-
utory labor exemption, even under the more restrictive Mackey test,
provides an exemption to Section 1 for “mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining” which “primarily affect the parties involved” that are
“reached through bona fide, arm’s-length bargaining,” which is ex-
emplified by collective bargaining.270  It is worth noting both that
neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals, in Fraser, men-
tion the non-statutory labor exemption, and that the exemptions
could not have applied in the lawsuit because the players had not
yet unionized, meaning no collective bargaining had yet taken
place.271  However, the players have since unionized, resulting in
265. See id. (discussing University of California’s form of free agency).
266. Id.
267. Id. (suggesting MLS should adopt such a system in order to provide play-
ers free agency without risking single entity status).
268. See Bank, Who Won Negotiations, supra note 261 (“[F]reedom of move- R
ment with a pre-set raise that is a function of league policy rather than market
forces does nothing to establish the economic independence of the teams and
therefore likely does not threaten the single-entity defense.”).
269. See Lennarz, supra note 67, at 199 (“One additional factor that renders R
the single entity consideration irrelevant is the fact that recent precedent indicates
the MLS Players’ union may not be capable of bringing an antitrust claim against
the league as a bargaining tactic at all.”).
270. Edelman & Doyle, supra note 42, at 416 (discussing the Mackey test).  For R
further discussion of the non-statutory labor exemption, see supra notes 148–175 R
and accompanying text.
271. See generally Fraser II, 284 F.3d 47, 58 (1st Cir. 2002) (ignoring any discus-
sion of statutory or non-statutory labor exemption); Fraser I, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D.
Mass. 2000), aff’d 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002). See also Lennarz, supra note 67, at R
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collective bargaining agreements, including the most recent signed
in 2015.272  As the Designated Player Rule and free agency were
collectively bargained in connection with this most recent CBA, a
Section 1 challenge centered around them by the players at this
point would be exempted.273
One commentator notes the players might try to decertify as a
union after the current CBA expires, thus removing the con-
straint.274  This commentator, however, also notes that doing so
might be ineffective if doing so was “merely . . . a tactical maneu-
ver,” and not the real end of the relationship between the players
and the league.275  For instance, in Brady v. NFL,276 the NFLPA
decertified in response to a threatened lockout by the league after
the existing CBA expired in order to remove the non-statutory la-
bor exemption, alleging the lockout “would constitute a group boy-
cott and price fixing agreement” in violation of Section 1.277  The
court in Brady did not address the non-statutory labor exception
itself, however in oral argument the court intimated “that the ex-
emption ends within six months to a year.”278  Whether six months,
one year, or a shorter or longer period of time, the Brady court is
mostly in line with Brown, in which the Supreme Court held that
“an agreement among employers could be sufficiently distant in
time and in circumstances from the collective-bargaining process
147–48 n.22 (citations omitted) (“In this case, by bringing an antitrust challenge
before forming a collective bargaining unit, the MLS players could affirmatively
avoid the scope of the exemption.”).
272. See Our Story, MLSPA, https://mlsplayers.org/about-us/ [https://perma
.cc/6TTY-T8QC] (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (“Formed in April 2003, the Players
Association ensures protection of the rights of all MLS Players, while also promot-
ing their best interests.”). See generally COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER AND MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER PLAYERS UNION:
FEBRUARY 1, 2015–JANUARY 31, 2020, https://mlsplayers.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/04/Collective-Bargaining-Agreement-February-1-2015.pdf [https://perma
.cc/FQA3-JZB3] (latest CBA between MLS and MLSPA).
273. See Lennarz, supra note 67, at 147 n.22 (“The non-statutory labor exemp- R
tion is a common law concept that removes certain aspects of labor-management
collective bargaining agreements from antitrust scrutiny.”).
274. Decurtins, supra note 187, at 350–51 (noting courts decide whether R
decertification is sufficient “on a case-by-case basis”).
275. Id.
276. 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011).
277. Id. at 663 (outlining facts leading to lawsuit). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2012) (Section 1 of Sherman Act).
278. Prosser, supra note 175, at 648 (detailing positive outcomes for players in R
Brady).
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that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not significantly
interfere with that [collective bargaining] process.”279
As a result, would-be plaintiff players would have a difficult
time proceeding to a Section 1 claim for two reasons: first, the high
procedural hurdle of decertification necessary to successfully argue
to a court that enough time has passed for intervention, and sec-
ond, the legislative history and jurisprudence strongly favors the
collective bargaining process, seemingly requiring a longer, rather
than shorter, period of time.280  However, decertification is unlikely
because the league, by offering small concessions such as limited
free agency that does not call into question its single entity status,
has shown a willingness and ability to capably negotiate with the
players, and because the MLS Players Union, in the lead up to the
2015 CBA, strongly indicated its support of MLS as a single entity,
which, even if only lip service to the league, shows that the players
find negotiation preferable to litigation.281
2. An Unsettled Investor-Operator Challenge
Another potential source of Section 1 lawsuit comes from the
actual investor-operators in MLS.282  If an investor-operator looking
to relocate the team it operates is overruled in that endeavor by the
league—a situation similar to that in Raiders I—or is disgruntled
when a designated player is awarded to another team, they could
institute a lawsuit alleging a violation of Section 1.283  Whether or
not such a challenge would be successful, however, it is unlikely in
the context of pro/rel for two reasons: the first purely economic,
and the second both economic and competitive.284  First, by main-
taining a status as the top league in the country, a closed league can
279. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (holding to do so
would also require consideration of National Labor Relations Board’s views).  For
further discussion of Brown, see supra notes 173–175 and accompanying text. R
280. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 42, at 415–16 (discussing non-statutory R
labor exemption and policy favoring collective bargaining over antitrust
litigation).
281. See Bank, Should MLS Players Skip, supra note 81 (suggesting MLS Players R
Union head, Bob Foose, went “out of his way to avoid brandishing the lawsuit
threat” to “defuse tensions and facilitate negotiation”).
282. See Stebbins supra note 40, at 35 (suggesting investor-operators whose R
relocation is denied by MLS “would likely have a valid antitrust claim”).
283. See id. (arguing investor-operator would be successful if it “could estab-
lish that other operators prohibited the move for competitive reasons”).  For fur-
ther discussion of Raiders I, see supra notes 128–134 and accompanying text. R
284. See Ross & Szymanski supra note 23, at 630–31 (discussing economics of R
promotion and relegation).  For further discussion of initial economic conclusions
of closed leagues, see supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. R
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inhibit entry by new teams and permit it only when a significant
expansion fee is paid, which generally decreases economic competi-
tion and allows the league to set “the number of franchises so as to
maximize [the] average revenue per club.”285  Indeed, while soccer
clubs around the world tend not to turn a profit—spending rela-
tively more on player salaries than MLS—MLS and its teams con-
tinue to earn profits while quickly increasing in value, representing
a strong financial investment for the investor-operators.286
Second, by opening the league to pro/rel, the litigious inves-
tor-operator, while potentially successful in the courtroom, would
open itself to demotion.287  While such a demotion would make for
sporting, as well as economic gains for the newly promoted club,
demotion to a lower tier tends to decrease a given team’s reve-
nue.288  Therefore, the economic incentives of maintaining a closed
league with the financial success MLS has had, coupled with the
downsides involved with a potential demotion, would likely be
enough to keep an investor-operator from suing with the goal of
instituting pro/rel.289
285. Id. at 630 (discussing economic reasons why closed leagues “restrict ac-
cess to a point below the socially optimal level”); see also Chris Smith, Major League
Soccer’s Most Valuable Teams, FORBES (Aug. 16, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/chrissmith/2017/08/16/major-league-soccers-most-valuable-teams-2/
#e4ce630b815d [https://perma.cc/YK87-9UNR] (“[P]rospective MLS team own-
ers across the country are clamoring for a piece of the league, even with the next
round of expansion now costing new owners a fee of $150 million, a whopping
275% increase from just five years ago when the Montreal Impact paid $40
million.”).
286. See Coppage, supra note 180, at 558 (suggesting “global clubs turning a R
profit is almost unheard of” whereas MLS currently sees “an unprecedented level
of stability”); see also Smith, supra note 285 (“[T]he average MLS team is now worth R
$223 million, up 20% from last year.”).
287. For further discussion of the mechanics of pro/rel, see supra notes 22–38 R
and accompanying text.
288. See ROGER G NOLL, STAN. INST. FOR ECON. POL’Y RES., THE ECONOMICS OF
PROMOTION AND RELEGATION IN SPORTS LEAGUES: THE CASE OF ENGLISH FOOTBALL
38 (2002), https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/01-16_0
.pdf [https://perma.cc/BRF8-5G6Y] (“[T]eams that are relegated do worse finan-
cially than they would if they finished in the bottom group of teams in the higher
league.”).
The financial information indicates that promotion is financially attrac-
tive as well as desired by fans.  Both revenues and attendance at league
matches tend to increase substantially when teams are promoted.  Moreo-
ver, the reward from promotion seems to endure for a while after a team
is demoted, giving teams that are marginal for a higher league financial
incentive to field teams that bounce back and forth between a higher and
lower league.
Id. at 37.
289. See Ross & Szymanski supra note 23, at 629 (“We think it unlikely that R
clubs themselves would voluntarily introduce such a system.”).
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3. A Rising Lower-Level Club Challenge
Based on the above discussion, a Section 1 challenge with the
aim of instituting pro/rel would most likely come from below.290
Under pro/rel, if a team playing in a division directly below MLS
won the league, then the next year it would have the benefit of
playing in MLS, which would give it both the sporting and eco-
nomic benefits of promotion.291  Currently, however, the only way a
team can join MLS is through expansion, a process requiring a
huge investment of up-front expansion fees, in addition to league
approval.292  Under American Needle, to move past the single entity
defense and subject the league to a full rule of reason analysis, a
challenger would need to establish that the investor-operators, in
forming MLS and actually controlling its decisions, are contracting
or combining to consolidate their economic interests into one
body, despite actually holding separate economic interests, and re-
sulting in a deprivation of independent centers of decisionmaking
in the relevant marketplace.293  The inquiry, therefore, would be
about “substance over form.”294
Generally, the challenger would argue first that, much like the
NFL teams in American Needle, MLS teams compete on the field for
wins, and off the field for various forms of revenue.295  First, the
Designated Player Rule allows teams to compete for high quality
players coming to MLS from other leagues, benefiting the teams
with wealthier investor-operators who can afford to pay the addi-
290. See Stebbins, supra note 40, at 36 (“It would not be inconceivable if the R
owner of a lower division team filed a suit in an effort to force their way into the
league.”).
291. See NOLL, supra note 288, at 36–37 (discussing benefits of promotions). R
For further discussion of pro/rel’s benefits to promoted teams, see supra note 288 R
and accompanying text.
292. See Smith, supra note 285 (reporting MLS expansion “fee of $150 mil- R
lion, a whopping 275% increase from just five years ago”).
293. See Am. Needle, Inc., v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 195 (stating that to defeat
single entity defense, “[t]he relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether there is a con-
tract combination . . . or conspiracy amongst separate economic actors pursuing
separate economic interests, such that the agreement deprives the marketplace of
independent centers of decisionmakings, and therefore of diversity of en-
trepreneurial interests, and thus of actual or potential competition”) (citations
omitted) (internal quotations omitted).  For further discussion of Am. Needle, see
supra notes 230–241 and accompanying text. R
294. See Jakobsze, supra note 238, at 145.  The author further noted that “the R
‘competitive reality’ of the parties, rather than their respective legal designations”
is important. Id. (quoting Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 196).
295. See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 196–97 (finding NFL teams “compete with one
another . . . to attract fans, for gate receipts, and for contracts with managerial and
playing personnel”) (citations omitted).
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tional salary.296  As discussed in analyzing a potential player chal-
lenge, the history of designated players being “assigned” to teams
reveals that the typical player allocation process, which is aimed at
creating sporting parity throughout the league, takes a back seat to
the wishes of the player in question, who may be attracted to certain
teams or markets for a variety of reasons.297  Teams financially able
to take advantage of the Rule not only receive a player who will help
them win more games but also the added opportunity for related
revenue.298  As a result, the Rule and its application weighs heavily
toward finding the single entity defense should not apply to
MLS.299
Second, since Fraser, the economics of being an investor-opera-
tor have changed, benefitting certain teams over others.300  For in-
stance, teams may keep seventy percent of their ticket sales,
revenue from parking and various stadium-related streams of in-
come, revenue from local broadcast and sponsorship deals, sales
from merchandise sold at their stadiums, and between two-thirds
and three-quarters of player transfer fees accrued when selling play-
ers to teams in other leagues.301  This means that although investor-
operators still rely on the league as a whole for a substantial portion
of their revenue, they are also better able to rely on their own teams
for revenue, “reduc[ing] the commonality of interest between the
296. See Lennarz, supra note 67, at 196–97 (conceding Designated Player Rule R
“does not necessarily destroy the hybrid entity concept that the First Circuit
vaguely referenced in Fraser,” but that “there is no question that the introduction
of the exception fundamentally alters the analysis of the league’s structure should
any future legal inquiry into its entity status occur”) (internal quotations omitted).
297. For further discussion of the Designated Player Rule and examples of
the process by which players join teams by it, see supra notes 250–260 and accom- R
panying text.
298. See Stebbins, supra note 40, at 25 (“Teams that can afford a high-level DP R
perform markedly better on the field and reap financial rewards off of the field.”).
For instance, after David Beckham signed a $225 million contract to play for the
Los Angeles Galaxy as a Designated Player, “the team signed a $20 million [ ]
jersey sponsorship deal and a new local television contract worth more than any
other in league history.” Id. at 24.  An investor-operator may be able to leverage a
new Designated Player for additional in-stadium revenue, such as jersey sales, as
well as other local revenue, a large portion of which the investor-operator may
retain. See infra notes 301–305 and accompanying text. R
299. For further conclusion of the Designated Player Rule, see supra note 260 R
and accompanying text.
300. See infra notes 301–306 and accompanying text. See generally Lennarz, R
supra note 67, at 197–98 (discussing investor-operators and their relationship to R
the league their team is in).
301. See Isaac Krasny, Unpacking the Major League Soccer Business Model, MEDIUM
(June 7, 2017), https://medium.com/@isaacccccccccc_94128/unpacking-the-ma-
jor-league-soccer-business-model-827f4b784bcd [https://perma.cc/9NMA-9FPQ]
(detailing current structure of MLS’s business model).
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[investor-operators] and the league” and allowing them to make
more independent economic and sporting decisions.302
Third, investor-operators are now fully responsible for stadium
costs and ownership, player development, team travel, and front of-
fice personnel salaries, including coaches and general managers.303
As a result of these changing benefits and obligations, investor-op-
erators can now personally affect and keep a larger portion of their
team-specific revenue, which increases their incentive to act in their
own economic self-interest.304  For instance, by investing in
coaches, general managers, training facilities, and development
programs to field more competitive teams, and coupling these in-
vestments with a higher quality stadium, investor-operators may in-
crease in-person viewership, and, as a result, income from the
various streams of revenue discussed above.305  As a result, one com-
mentator argues that “[i]investor-[o]perators see the same ultimate
costs and profits as they would were they more loosely organ-
ized.”306  Therefore, if this challenge came from a lower-level club,
the First Circuit would ultimately have its day and MLS’s single en-
tity defense would fail, because MLS seems even less of a “hybrid
arrangement” today as it did in 2002.307  Indeed, the key may be the
American Needle Court’s emphasis on “whether, from the viewpoint
of third parties, teams are potential competitors,” and certainly,
looking at the above factors, an outside club would see a league no
302. Lennarz, supra note 67, at 198 (arguing unity of interest among investor- R
operators decreases as more teams are operated by investors interested in only one
team).
303. See Krasny, supra note 301 (reporting “MLS pays all normal player sala- R
ries,” but “[t]he rest of the operational expenses are largely up to the individual
Investor-Operators”).
304. See supra notes 301–303 and accompanying text; see also Lennarz, supra R
note 67, at 197 (discussing changing incentives for investor-operators). R
305. See Lennarz, supra note 67, at 196 (arguing “[t]eam [o]wnership of R
[s]tadiums [i]ncreases [e]ntity [s]eparation”).
[S]tadium ownership constitutes an investment made by a specific team’s
operator-investor in which the rest of the league has no stake.  Stadium
ownership is both an assumption of liability and a source of revenue for
an individual team that further separates the unity of interest between
that team and the rest of the league.
Id.
306. Krasny, supra note 301. R
307. See Fraser II, 284 F.3d 47, 58 (1st Cir. 2002) (“MLS and its operator/
investors comprise a hybrid arrangement, somewhere between a single company
. . . and a cooprerative arrangement between existing competitors”); see also Len-
narz, supra note 67, at 200 (“MLS probably no longer qualifies as ‘single entity’ R
from an antitrust standpoint.”).
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different than any other major sport in the U.S.308  Therefore,
given the proper plaintiff, the single entity defense would not pro-
tect MLS from a full-on rule of reason analysis of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.309
IV. CONCLUSION
When MLS was founded in 1995, its creators followed the
American sporting tradition, and disregarded the lead of the major-
ity of soccer leagues, by creating a closed league structure.310  How-
ever, unlike MLB, the NFL, the NBA, and the NHL, the founders
had a long history of antitrust litigation against those leagues and
an unsuccessful, yet glamorous, previous professional soccer league
from which to draw.311  As a result, the founders created MLS in a
single entity structure in order to maintain centralized control,
curb rapid growth while avoiding commercial failure, and spurn
Section 1 attacks.312  Practically, the league’s decision to do so was
informed by the failure of the NASL.313  Legally, the league’s deci-
sion to do so was informed by years of antitrust litigation involving
the other major professional sports leagues, as well as the landmark
case of Copperweld, which seemed to open the door for the single
entity defense.314  After an early-yet-precarious victory in Fraser,
MLS has spent the past decade and a half having its single entity
status scrutinized, while also receiving calls to make a switch to pro/
rel.315  In the same period, the league has undergone significant
changes, particularly with respect to player contracts and investor-
operator opportunity, which has decreased the league’s unity of in-
terest in such a way that has further opened the league up to a
308. Jakobsze, supra note 238, at 146 (arguing “[t]his viewpoint will be imper- R
ative when assessing the competitive reality of MLS”).
309. For further discussion of a rule of reason analysis as part of a Section 1
challenge, see supra note 108 and accompanying text. R
310. For further discussion of MLS’ founding, see supra notes 180–186 and R
accompanying text.
311. For further discussion of the NASL and antitrust cases prior to MLS, see
supra notes 67–175 and accompanying text. R
312. For further discussion of the reasons why MLS’s structure was chosen
over others, see supra note 186 & 202 and accompanying text. R
313. For further discussion of the NASL, see supra notes 67–78 and accompa- R
nying text.
314. For further discussion of the Sherman Act and the single entity defense,
see supra notes 85–144 and accompanying text. R
315. For further discussion of a potential Section 1 challenge from lower divi-
sion club and its implication on MLS’ single entity status, see supra notes 290–309 R
and accompanying text.
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challenge to its single entity status.316  Such a challenge would ulti-
mately be successful, but would necessarily need to come from the
correct plaintiff.317
Because of the non-statutory labor exemption, bolstered by
Brady v. NFL, another player challenge is highly unlikely to happen
or be successful.318  Similarly, a current investor-operator would
also be highly unlikely to bring such a challenge, because of the
economic incentives of operating a closed league, and the uncer-
tainty of instituting pro/rel.319  However, in the wake of American
Needle, and with the guidance of the First Circuit’s dicta in Fraser, a
team seeking meritocratic entry into the league would be able to
convince a court that, for purposes of displaying professional soccer
matches, MLS should no longer be considered a single entity, thus
opening the door to a full rule of reason analysis under Section
1.320  Without such a challenge or any change of heart from the
league’s leaders, however, MLS will continue to operate as a closed
league for the foreseeable future.321
Brendan H. Ewing*
316. For further discussion of these changes, see supra notes 251–268 & R
301–303 and accompanying text. R
317. For further discussion of what how successful challenge would look, see
supra notes 248–309 and accompanying text. R
318. For further discussion of a potential player challenge, see supra notes
282–289 and accompanying text. R
319. For further discussion of a potential investor-operator challenge, see
supra notes 290–309 and accompanying text. R
320. For further discussion of such a challenge, see supra notes 290–308 and R
accompanying text.
321. See Molinaro, supra note 19 (reporting league not planning on adopting R
pro/rel).
* J.D. Candidate, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.A. in
History, Colgate University.  I would like to thank my family for always encouraging
more education.  I would especially like to thank my wife, Kylie, for her love and
patience.
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